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And the Wall Came Tumbling Down:
Secret Surveillance After the Terror
WILLIAM C. BANKS*
One inevitable byproduct of the September 11 terrorist attacks has
been widespread criticism of what appears to some as a yawning failure
of intelligence - why didn't we know enough about the terrorists and
their plan to prevent the attack? In the months and years since the
calamitous attacks, allegations of failures in gathering, assessing and
sharing intelligence information have reached a crescendo. By and
large, the critics charge that intelligence agencies failed to "connect the
dots," at least in part because the intelligence players - in particular the
pertinent divisions within the FBI and CIA - were not talking to one
another, or were doing so inefficiently and incompletely. In a December
2002 report, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence vice-chair Richard
Shelby described a series of missed signals and misinterpreted leads
that, in his mind, could have forewarned of a horrific terrorist attack.
Shelby insisted that September 11 "should be an object lesson in the
perils of failing to share information promptly and efficiently between
(and within) organizations."1
Congressional investigators detailed a series of blunders in failing
to "connect the dots" before September 11.2 Failures of information-
sharing were supposedly legion: warnings about imminent attacks by Al
Qaeda upon U.S. targets were accompanied by intelligence that terrorists
might use aircraft as weapons, that operatives would seek training as
pilots at U.S. flight schools, and that known Al Qaeda terrorists were
residing openly within the United States. The CIA failed to share infor-
mation about the two known terrorists with the FBI or INS until late
August 2001, when efforts to locate them failed. Subsequently, on Sep-
tember 11, the men boarded American Airlines Flight 77 and flew it into
the Pentagon. Similarly, when a Phoenix FBI field office agent for-
warded his concern about Al Qaeda operatives training at U.S. flight
schools, FBI headquarters took no action, at least in part because the
* Laura J. and L. Douglas Meredith Professor, Syracuse University College of Law. The
author thanks M. E. (Spike) Bowman, Stephen Dycus, and Peter Raven-Hansen for helpful
comments on a draft of this article, and Michael Bemer for research assistance.
1. See Senator Richard C. Shelby, Vice Chairman, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,
September 11 and the Imperative of Reform in the U.S. Intelligence Community, at 5 (Dec. 10,
2002) [hereinafter Shelby Report], available at http://intelligence.senate.gov/Shelby.pdf.
2. See id. at 3-11.
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CIA did not share with the FBI its intelligence indicating that terrorists
could use aircraft as weapons.3 Finally, when Minneapolis FBI field
agents grew suspicious of flight school attendee Zacarias Moussaoui in
July 2001, their request to headquarters seeking an order permitting
secret surveillance of his activities was turned down on the basis that
investigators had too little factual information linking Moussaoui to any
terrorist organization. Moussaoui is now awaiting trial on charges that
he conspired to murder the World Trade Center and Pentagon victims.4
The effort to place blame for September 11 has supported the ongo-
ing campaign by the Department of Justice to expand what Attorney
General John Ashcroft maintains are essential new tools in the war
against terrorism. Some of the new tools that became law in the USA
Patriot Act5 purport to respond directly to alleged shortcomings in the
sharing of information between intelligence and law enforcement
officials.
Since 1978, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act6 (FISA) has
prescribed procedures for conducting electronic surveillance (and since
1994 for physical searches) within the United States for foreign intelli-
gence purposes. Rules governing law enforcement searches and elec-
tronic surveillance are found within the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure and Title III of the 1968 Crime Control Act, as amended.7
Although their investigations often overlap, the rules that apply to the
two types of investigations are markedly different. Because the Fourth
Amendment protects "the people ... against unreasonable searches and
seizures," 8 the backdrop for both sets of rules is a core protection for
individual privacy. 9 When the privacy stakes are higher - when crimi-
nal processes and sanctions, including incarceration, may follow - the
rules are most protective of the individual and require the government to
meet exacting standards before carrying out intrusive investigations.
When the aim is to collect foreign intelligence information, the secret
and less protective rules and procedures of FISA may be employed. The
justifications for using the more permissive FISA mechanism include
the fact that the danger of espionage or international terrorism is grave,
3. Id. at 29.
4. See Philip Shenon, Moussaoui Case May Have to Shift from U.S. Court to Tribunal,
Administration Says, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2003, at A13.
5. Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
6. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of (978 (FISA), 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1829, 1841-
1846, 1861-1863 (West Supp. 2000).
7. Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 802. 82 Stat. 197, 212 (1968) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2510-2520).
8. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
9. See, e.g., MARK REIBLING, THE WEDGE: THE SECRET WAR BETWEEN THE FBI AND CIA
(1994).
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and that the privacy intrusions are limited to the collection of informa-
tion for foreign intelligence purposes."°
The current and at least near-term future climate calls into question
the separation of law enforcement and intelligence roles that have been
at the center of government's counter terrorism investigative strategy.
On the one hand, if the wall between law enforcement and intelligence
collection is breached, Congress's objectives in FISA may be thwarted
and the Constitution may be violated. On the other hand, if law enforce-
ment and intelligence functions are not permitted to work together effec-
tively to combat terrorism, grave harm to the nation could occur.
In an unprecedented public release of proceedings before the secret
FISA tribunal in the summer of 2002, the Foreign Intelligence Surveil-
lance Court (FISC) rejected in part proposed Department of Justice pro-
cedures used for coordinating the work of intelligence and law
enforcement personnel carrying out surveillance and search activities
under FISA, as amended by the Patriot Act. In a unanimous opinion by
all seven FISA judges, the FISC ruled that the Criminal Division of the
Justice Department could not direct and control surveillance and
searches pursuant to FISA for law enforcement ends. The court ruled
that having the prosecutors so directly involved in running a FISA inves-
tigation would undermine what Congress created - a special mechanism
for gathering foreign intelligence information. Further, the judges
seemed worried that if the Justice Department proposal were permitted
to stand unaltered, important Fourth Amendment interests could be
threatened by the substitution of FISA procedures for Title III of the
Crime Control Act when the objective of the investigation was to
prosecute.
Following this extraordinary decision by the FISC, the government
pursued the first-ever appeal under FISA. The inaugural decision of the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review (FISCR) in Novem-
ber 2002 reversed the FISC decision and reinstated the Justice Depart-
ment guidelines that all but eliminate the wall between intelligence
collection and law enforcement."I As it now stands, the government
may take advantage of the secretive and less protective procedures of
FISA to plan and carry out surveillance and searches of American citi-
zens, without giving notice or conducting any proceeding before a mag-
istrate. In essence, these activities could be conducted with the primary
aim of prosecuting the target.
10. The term "foreign intelligence" encompasses counterintelligence and counterterrorism as
well as other national security concerns, such as weapons of mass destruction.
11. In re Sealed Case Nos. 02-001, 02-002, 310 F.3d 717 (U.S. Foreign Intell. Surveil. Ct.
Rev., 2002) [hereinafter FISCR Opinion].
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The FISCR decision is an unfortunate example of overreaching in
reaction to the September 11 terror attacks to protect security interests at
the expense of individual freedoms and the shared but bounded institu-
tional responsibilities for intelligence gathering and law enforcement.
While there are undoubtedly times when avoiding the Title III magis-
trate and criminal probable cause requirements would facilitate a terror-
ism investigation, those exceptional instances should occur only when
the government meets the requirements of FISA. To the extent that
prosecutors might direct and control FISA surveillance for law enforce-
ment purposes following the FISCR decision, the court erred. Whatever
else the USA Patriot Act amendments to FISA might have done, they
did not eviscerate the distinction between enforcing the laws and gather-
ing intelligence. Neither the Patriot Act nor FISA changed the underly-
ing constitutional protections afforded individuals in the United States.
Largely lost in the rush to supply correctives to the failures in infor-
mation-sharing and cooperation in the weeks and months after Septem-
ber 11 was the reality that laws were responsible only in a limited way
for erecting a wall to effective inter-agency or law enforcement/intelli-
gence community information-sharing. An institutional tradition hostile
to coordination in large part created the wall.' 2 In addition, officials in
the Department of Justice contributed to the coordination problem by
failing to fully understand how national security investigative authorities
differ from those that apply in law enforcement.
This essay will first describe the traditional intelligence and law
enforcement roles in counterterrorism. Part II will review the pre-FISA
legal context for national security surveillance and searches. Part III
includes an assessment of the evolving history concerning the relation-
ship between intelligence and law enforcement in implementing FISA,
culminating in the March 2002 procedures that prompted the FISC and
FISCR decisions. Part IV will evaluate the FISC and FISCR decisions,
identifying statutory and constitutional flaws in both decisions, and
looking for common ground between them. Finally, two concluding
sections will suggest reforms to FISA and to congressional oversight
that can better ensure the shared objectives of security and freedom.
These sections also will attempt to clarify where the foreign intelli-
gence/law enforcement overlap stands now.
I. INTELLIGENCE AND LAW ENFORCEMENT IN U.S. NATIONAL
SECURITY: ORIGINS OF THE WALL
By now it has become obvious to most observers that our nation's
12. See, e.g, RiEBLING, supra note 9.
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strategies to combat terrorism involve a variety of government functions
with overlapping roles and responsibilities, from emergency manage-
ment and public health, to border and customs protection, to the use of
law enforcement and even military force. A major component of our
counterterrorism strategy is interdiction - taking efforts to stop the ter-
rorists before they strike. An effective capability to conduct secret intel-
ligence collection is of critical importance in combating terrorism. At
the same time, counterterrorism objectives are increasingly being served
by criminalizing terrorist acts, as is evidenced by the dozens of new
criminal prohibitions on terrorist activities that have been enacted in
recent years.
Nonetheless, the divisions in the intelligence community that were
formalized with the creation of the Central Intelligence Agency in 1947
were created purposefully. In part, the FBI, and not the CIA, was
responsible for domestic security investigations because there was no
enthusiasm in the post-World War II years for a secret Gestapo-like
agency. 3 The Bureau was always the crime-fighter, but both agencies
collected intelligence. It was also the case, however, that intelligence
analysts knew the value of having two agencies in partial competition
for the same turf. Rivals produce an array of intelligence, and the ana-
lyst sifts through it to find what is of worth. Centralizing the intelli-
gence function under one roof might eliminate the advantages of
competition.
Fighting crime is like gathering intelligence in that it relies on
many of the same techniques to collect information. Information forms
the basis of evidence to support convictions and to learn about terrorism
or espionage acts before they occur. That information may be found
through public sources, through the use of informants, or through
searches and electronic surveillance. Law enforcement information
must often be shared among the agencies charged with fighting crime
and between the grand juries and courts involved in the prosecutions.
Of course, unlike traditional law enforcement investigations, intelligence
collection operations are secret. Their objective is to learn about the
target person or organization, the target's aims and methods, and some-
times to "turn" the target to become an intelligence asset.' 4 In addition,
the surveillance may continue for months or even years.
In many situations, intelligence officials work alongside law
enforcement personnel, and the information gathered in the intelligence
13. See JOHN RANELAGH, THE AGENCY: THE RISE AND DECLINE OF THE CIA 104-11 (1986).
14. See William C. Banks & M.E. Bowman, Executive Authority for National Security
Surveillance, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 7 (2000).
20031
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
operation becomes evidence in an eventual criminal conviction.' 5 How-
ever, foreign intelligence is also sometimes sought simply to keep tabs
on foreign groups, absent any anticipated criminal activity. Foreign
intelligence gathering is, therefore, sometimes less targeted and more
programmatic than law enforcement collection. Moreover, foreign intel-
ligence information may also be harder for someone outside the intelli-
gence community to evaluate. Pieces may be understood only as part of
a mosaic of information, by contrast to the often more specific, historical
information obtained for particular law enforcement purposes. Tradi-
tional legal standards that insist on particularity, criminality, and even-
tual notice to the target in law enforcement surveillance and searches are
ill-suited for foreign intelligence gathering.
The distinction between these role assignments has never been neat
and clean. Instead, intelligence collection and law enforcement roles
often overlap, normally in productive ways. Good intelligence work
may provide criminal investigators or prosecutors with the tip they need
to make a case. Alternatively, the law enforcement team may learn
important intelligence information useful for future collection efforts in
the course of interrogation or evidence collection in a criminal investiga-
tion. In other fundamental ways, however, intelligence and law enforce-
ment investigations are different. Where intelligence collection looks
toward preventing future acts, law enforcement usually focuses on a
past-completed act. While a criminal investigation normally ends with a
decision to prosecute, investigation of the same targets for intelligence
purposes may continue even after prosecution.
In recent years, one aspect of the counterterrorism strategy of the
United States government has been to increase the collaboration and
sharing of information between law enforcement and intelligence inves-
tigators. Cooperation and information sharing between intelligence and
law enforcement agencies is a formidable task. In part, this challenge is
present in any intelligence agency setting because of the tension between
the need for security and secrecy and the demand for sharing informa-
tion. Leaks are anathema, and compromised sources are useless. At the
same time, completely 'secure information is not useful to anyone. As
the goals of the different types of investigation are so different, criminal
investigators and prosecutors have been counseled repeatedly to stay
"clean" - to avoid contaminating possible prosecution evidence through
contacts with intelligence officials.' 6 Separate cultures have developed
within the FBI, for example, where national security and Criminal Divi-
15. Id. at 4.
16. See Jonathan M. Fredman, Intelligence Agencies, Law Enforcement, and the Prosecution
Team, 16 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 331, 337-38 (1998).
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sion personnel have traditionally operated in discrete spheres with lim-
ited interaction between one another.
Galvanized by the failures in information sharing and cooperation
that some maintained might have prevented the September 11 attacks,' 7
the Bush Administration, particularly Attorney General Ashcroft, has
made a concerted effort to break down these barriers to effective
counterterrorism investigations. In essence, the Department of Justice
has vigorously promoted a strategy of turning loose all the investigative
resources of the nation through the most permissive legal standards
available in an effort to prevent terrorist activities in the United States.
As the Attorney General noted, the Department of Justice has added a
"paradigm of prevention"18 to that of prosecution in response to terrorist
threats. The new paradigm encompasses and increasingly blends the
previously discrete intelligence gathering and law enforcement func-
tions. In recent years, and particularly after September 11, criminal
investigators and prosecutors are as likely engaged as intelligence offi-
cials in the prevention effort. Some would say that FBI counterterrorism
agents have long been engaged in prevention, notwithstanding the Attor-
ney General's implication to the contrary.
II. THE PRE-FISA CONTEXT FOR NATIONAL
SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS
Throughout much of the 20th century, the executive branch
engaged in warrantless electronic surveillance and searches of targets
within the United States based on the President's asserted inherent
authority to protect the national security. 9 This practice of unmonitored
surveillance ebbed during the Vietnam War and civil rights eras as anti-
war and civil rights activists were targeted based on a belief that their
activities threatened the national security. In many instances the surveil-
lance targeted individuals or domestic groups with no connection to any
foreign power.2" The investigative excesses were curbed in the early
1970s, as government became caught in the fallout from the Watergate
17. See Joint Inquiry Staff Memorandum: The FBI's Handling of the Phoenix Electronic
Communication and Investigation of Zacarias Moussaoui Prior to September 11, 2001, (Sept. 24,
2002) (statement of Eleanor Hill, Staff Director, Joint Inquiry Staff), available at http://
www.fas.org/irp/congress/2002-hr/092402hill.html; see also REPORT OF THE JOINT INQUIRY INTO
THE TERRORIST ATTACKS OF SEPTEMBER 11, 2001, S. REP. No. 107-351, at 1-127 (2002),
available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/serialset/creports/91 lhtml.
18. Adam Liptak, Under Ashcroft, Judicial Power Flows Back to Washington, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 16, 2003, at wk5.
19. See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, S. REP. No. 95-604, at 9-12 (1977).
20. See Select Committee to Study Government Operations with Respect to Intelligence
Activities, Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans, S. REP. No. 94-755, Book III, at
355 (1976).
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scandal, the end of the Vietnam War, and extensive congressional and
public disclosures of these prior abuses.
Thirty years ago, before the enactment of FISA, the Supreme Court
first confronted the tensions between unmonitored executive surveil-
lance and individual freedoms in the national security setting. United
States v. United States District Court"l arose from a criminal proceeding
in which the United States charged three defendants with conspiracy to
destroy government property - a planned dynamite bombing of a CIA
office in Ann Arbor, Michigan.22 During pretrial proceedings, the
defendants moved to compel disclosure of electronic surveillance. In
response, although the Government admitted that a warrantless wiretap
had intercepted conversations involving the defendants, it defended its
actions in the Supreme Court on the basis of both the Constitution and a
national security disclaimer in the 1968 Crime Control Act.23
Justice Powell's opinion for the Court rejected the statutory argu-
ment and concluded that the Crime Control Act disclaimer of any inten-
tion to legislate regarding national security surveillance had not created
executive powers, but had simply left presidential powers in the area
untouched.24 Turning to the constitutional claim, the Court found
authority for national security surveillance implicit in the President's
Article II Oath Clause, which includes the power "to protect our Gov-
ernment against those who would subvert or overthrow it by unlawful
means."2 5 However, the "broader spirit" of the Fourth Amendment, and
"the convergence of First and Fourth Amendment values" in national
security wiretapping cases, made the Court especially wary of possible
abuses of the national security power.26 Justice Powell then proceeded
to balance "the duty of Government to protect the domestic security,
against the potential danger posed by unreasonable surveillance to indi-
vidual privacy and free expression."27 In rejecting the Government's
position, he concluded that waiving the Fourth Amendment probable
cause requirement and allowing "unreviewed executive discretion"
could lead the executive to "yield too readily to pressures to obtain
incriminating evidence and overlook potential invasions of privacy and
21. 407 U.S. 297 (1972) [hereinafter Keith] (The decision is usually referred to by the name
of the district court judge who first heard it, Damon J. Keith).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 302-03 (The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act emphasized the
President's inherent constitutional power to protect national security free of any limitations); see
Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 802, 82 Stat. 197, 212 (1968).
24. Keith, 407 U.S. at 306.
25. Id. at 310; see also U.S. CoNsT. art. II., § I.
26. Keith, 407 U.S. at 313.
27. Id. at 314-15.
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protected speech. 28
The government argued for an exception to the warrant require-
ment, citing both the unique characteristics of ongoing national security
surveillance and fear that leaks could endanger sources and methods of
intelligence gathering. Justice Powell, however, answered that the poten-
tial for abuse of the surveillance power in this setting, along with the
capacity of the judiciary to manage sensitive information in ex parte
proceedings, rendered any inconvenience to the government "justified in
a free society to protect constitutional values. 29
Justice Powell was careful to emphasize that the case involved only
domestic targets of surveillance, and that the Court was not expressing
an opinion on the discretion to conduct surveillance when foreign pow-
ers or their agents are targeted. Finally, the Court left open the possibil-
ity that different warrant standards and procedures than those required in
normal criminal investigations might be applicable in a national security
investigation, presumably even one not involving foreign intelligence.
We recognize that domestic security surveillance may involve
different policy and practical considerations from the surveillance of
'ordinary crime.' The gathering of security intelligence is often long
range and involves the interrelation of various sources and types of
information. The exact targets of such surveillance may be more dif-
ficult to identify than in surveillance operations against many types of
crime specified in Title III. Often, too, the emphasis of domestic
intelligence gathering is on the prevention of unlawful activity or the
enhancement of the Government's preparedness for some possible
future crisis or emergency. Thus, the focus of domestic surveillance
may be less precise than that directed against more conventional
types of crime.30
The Court implicitly invited Congress to promulgate a set of stan-
dards for these types of surveillance:
Different standards may be compatible with the Fourth Amendment
if they are reasonable both in relation to the legitimate need of Gov-
ernment for intelligence information and the protected rights of our
citizens. For the warrant application may vary according to the gov-
ernmental interest to be enforced and the nature of the citizen rights
deserving protection.
Although Congress did not react immediately to the Keith decision, Jus-
tice Powell's opinion provided an important impetus for the develop-
ment of what would become FISA. Like the Supreme Court, Congress
28. Id. at 317.
29. Id. at 319-21.
30. Id. at 323.
31. Id. at 322-23 (emphasis added).
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recognized that warrantless surveillance by the executive branch could
undermine important constitutional values at the confluence of the First
and Fourth Amendments. At the same time, Congress came to appreci-
ate that the nature and purpose of intelligence investigations differ con-
siderably from those of criminal law enforcement investigations.
Congress recognized that the traditional warrant requirement practiced
by law enforcement might not be the best model for assuring a fair bal-
ance between security and liberty in national security investigations
seeking foreign intelligence.32
While the Keith decision served as the constitutional foundation for
FISA, another surveillance dispute was ongoing when FISA was
enacted. In 1976, a Vietnamese citizen living in the United States began
sending packages to Vietnamese government officials in Paris, through a
Vietnamese-American who also happened to be a CIA agent.33 The
Department of Justice undertook a warrantless search of one of the pack-
ages. Although the courier was authorized to open and inspect the pack-
age, that permission was not given on the basis of any asserted foreign
intelligence exception to the warrant requirement, but rather on the
grounds that there was no reasonable expectation of privacy regarding
the contents of the package. After this inspection revealed that classified
documents were being delivered to a Vietnamese official in Paris, the
Attorney General obtained the President's personal approval to search
subsequent packages that would normally have been protected by a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy. The Attorney General also approved a
wiretap of the target's telephone.34 Once intelligence officials learned
that the source of the classified documents was a U.S. citizen employed
by the United States Information Agency, the Attorney General author-
ized covert television surveillance of the citizen's office.35
The criminal division of the Justice Department was informed of
the status of the investigation on a regular basis, and the USIA employee
and the Vietnamese-American were indicted, in January 1978. After the
defendants challenged the constitutionality of the package searches and
electronic surveillance, the district court held an evidentiary hearing and
ruled that on July 20, 1977, the investigation had become "primarily a
criminal investigation. '36 Thus, the searches and surveillance conducted
32. United States v. Humphrey, 456 F. Supp. 51, 58-59 (E.D. Va. 1978). Congress has never
created procedures for surveillance or searches in national security investigations where no
foreign intelligence or connection to a foreign power is suspected. By default, then, such
investigations are subject to Title III and Rule 41.
33. See United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 911 (4th Cir. 1980).
34. Id. at 912.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 916.
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before July 20 were viewed as being primarily in pursuit of foreign intel-
ligence information. Focusing on the purposes of the surveillance,
rather than the investigation's purpose, the district court ruled that the
warrantless searches and surveillance before July 20 were lawful, con-
sistent with Keith, because their primary purpose was the pursuit of for-
eign intelligence information.37 However, evidence derived from the
same searches and surveillance after July 19 was suppressed. On
appeal, the government argued that "if surveillance is to any degree
directed at gathering foreign intelligence," the traditional warrant
requirement should not apply.38 In response, the defendants argued that
any exception to the warrant requirement could not apply unless the
search or surveillance was conducted "solely" to gather foreign intelli-
gence. 39 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected these polar alter-
natives in favor of a middle ground, holding that the executive branch
"should be excused from securing a warrant only when the surveillance
is conducted 'primarily' for foreign intelligence reasons. '"40
As developed by the Truong court, the "primary purpose" doctrine
reflects the court's view of what the Fourth Amendment requires. Any
lesser standard would presumably be unconstitutional. At the same
time, "primary purpose" is treated as a qualitative standard that invites
after-the-fact subjective judgments during evidentiary hearings, where
judges are inclined to defer to the decisions of intelligence professionals.
Additionally, in the midst of an investigation, the need for speedy
action, along with problems of coordination among law enforcement and
intelligence agencies, means that the intelligence professionals make
these "primary purpose" decisions, not a magistrate. The theory, how-
ever, is that once an investigation becomes primarily criminal in nature,
the courts are entirely competent to make the usual probable cause deter-
mination when surveillance or search authority is sought, and individual
privacy interests come to the fore when the government attempts to lay
the foundation for a criminal prosecution.
Congress enacted FISA while the Truong appeal was pending and
practically mooted the issue of whether warrantless electronic surveil-
lance within the United States for foreign intelligence purposes is consti-
tutional. 4 FISA implemented exclusive standards for conducting
37. Id. at 915.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. I say "practically" because, in theory, Congress cannot legislate to deny surveillance
authority that is part of a core Article II power of the executive. While the executive branch has
worked within FISA for 25 years, it remains possible that new threats or conditions could give rise
to renewed claims for warrantless executive branch surveillance authority.
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electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes within the
United States,42 and added similar standards for physical searches in
1994.4' The procedures and criteria for deciding what circumstances
would permit the issuance of surveillance and search orders emerged
through twenty-four years of practice under FISA. The federal courts
have repeatedly construed these procedures and criteria to be adequate
substitutes for the traditional law enforcement warrant, satisfying the
Fourth Amendment's "reasonableness" requirement.44 Central to the
development of this body of case law upholding the FISA procedures
has been the principle that FISA was designed for the gathering of for-
eign intelligence information and that any criminal prosecution that fol-
lows from surveillance undertaken pursuant to FISA has been incidental
to the purpose of gathering foreign intelligence information.
FISA authorizes the Attorney General to approve applications for
orders to conduct electronic surveillance or physical searches within the
United States for the purposes of foreign intelligence if there is probable
cause to believe that the target is a "foreign power" 45 or "agent of a
foreign power. The Act also requires that "an executive branch offi-
cial ... employed in the area of national security or defense [certify to
the FISC] that a significant purpose of the [FISA surveillance or search]
is to obtain foreign intelligence information. 47 In addition, FISA seeks
to ensure that intelligence officials are conducting their searches and sur-
veillances strictly for foreign intelligence purposes by requiring that
each certification designate the type of foreign intelligence information
being sought and explain the basis for this designation. FISA also pro-
vides for limited judicial review of those certifications.
Before the FISC issues an order approving electronic search or sur-
veillance involving a U.S. person,48 the FISC judge must find probable
cause that the target is an agent of a foreign power, based on meeting
42. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, § 1801(f)(i)-(4),92
Stat. 1783 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1829, 1841-1846, 1861-1863 (1978)).
43. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995, Pub. L. No. 103-359, § 302(a)(1),
108 Stat. 3423 (1994).
44. See, e.g., United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v. Johnson,
952 F.2d 565, 575 (1st Cir. 1991); United States v. Pelton, 835 F.2d 1067, 1075 (4th Cir. 1987);
United States v. Ott, 827 F.2d 473, 475-77 (9th Cir. 1987).
45. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(a) (1994).
46. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b) (2003) (amended by Act of Dec. 3, 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-120, 113
Stat. 1606, 1619-20).
47. 50 U.S.C. §1823(a)(7) (2001); see 50 U.S.C. §§ 1804(a)(7)(A),(B) (2001), and
§§ 1823(a)(7)(A), (B) (2001) (concerning electronic surveillance and search provisions).
48. The Act defines "United States person" to include a citizen of the United States, an alien
lawfully admitted for permanent residence, and an unincorporated association a substantial
number of members of which are citizens of the United States or aliens lawfully admitted for
permanent residence. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(i) (2001).
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one of four conditions: (1) the target knowingly engages in clandestine
intelligence activities on behalf of a foreign power, which "may
involve" a criminal law violation; (2) the target knowingly engages in
other secret intelligence activities on behalf of a foreign power pursuant
to the direction of an intelligence network, and those activities involve
or are about to involve criminal law violations; (3) the target knowingly
engages in sabotage or international terrorism or is preparing for such
activities;49 or (4) the target knowingly aids or abets another who acts in
one of the above ways.50 The connection to national security crimes is
thus explicit, but the predicate for obtaining permission to conduct secret
surveillance or search is by showing probable cause that the target is a
foreign agent, not probable cause that the target is involved in a crime.
Many criminal defendants since 1978 have asserted that certain
FISC-approved surveillance was not in fact conducted for the primary
purpose of foreign intelligence collection.51 In each such challenge, the
federal courts sustained the FISA surveillance under the Truong "pri-
mary purpose" test. While FISA demands that "the purpose" of any
surveillance or search be the gathering of foreign intelligence, a FISC
judge in each case granted approval of the surveillance or search and
found its primary purpose to be the pursuit of foreign intelligence or
foreign counterintelligence information. These initial rulings strength-
ened the government's defenses in federal courts.
III. FISA AND THE INTELLIGENCE/LAw ENFORCEMENT OVERLAP
The path from the Supreme Court's Keith decision to FISA lays
bare the kind of exceptional authority Congress was willing to provide
in the name of protecting national security. Early on, one Senate bill
would have made intelligence surveillance authority part of Title 18, the
title reserved for crimes and criminal procedure. Even so, the drafters
stated that authorized surveillance would be for foreign intelligence pur-
poses.52 Eventually this proposal was removed from Title 18 and placed
in Title 50, War and National Defense, a better fit since the bill estab-
49. FISA defines "international terrorism" to include activities that (1) involve violent acts
dangerous to human life that.., would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction
of the United States or any State; (2) appear to be intended (A) to intimidate or coerce a civilian
population; (B) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (C) to
affect the conduct of a government by assassination or kidnapping; and (3) occur totally outside
the United States, or transcend national boundaries. See 50 U.S.C. § 1801(c) (2003).
50. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(2) (1994).
51. See, e.g., United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F. 2d 908, 913 (4th Cir. 1980); United
States v. Falvey, 540 F. Supp. 1306 (E.D.N.Y. 1982); United States v. Megahey, 553 F. Supp.
1180 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
52. See H.R. REP. No. 95-1283 (1978) ("[i]f enacted, this legislation would require a judicial
warrant authorizing the following for foreign intelligence purposes."). I
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lished procedures dealing with the collection of foreign intelligence.53
Congress also recognized from the beginning that "no United States citi-
zen in the United States should be targeted for electronic surveillance by
his government absent some showing that he at least may violate the
laws of our society,"54 but also recognized that evidence of such national
security crimes may be gathered during surveillance. This association
with criminality was undoubtedly designed to forestall a return to the
days of politically motivated surveillance of U.S. citizens, but it also
shows that, while a suspicion of criminal activity is considered essential
when targeting U.S. citizens, Congress did not intend for FISA to in any
way authorize surveillance for law enforcement purposes. At the same
time, the drafters of FISA understood that intelligence gathering and law
enforcement would overlap in practice. Periodic oversight reviews of
FISA underscore congressional understanding that FISA-derived infor-
mation would sometimes be used in prosecutions.5
In the years since 1978, the emerging confluence of intelligence
gathering and law enforcement as elements of counterterrorism strategy
has strained the capacities of both FISA procedures and FBI personnel
attempts to manage the relationship between intelligence and law
enforcement. On the one hand, as the Department of Justice maintained,
"there is no dichotomy between intelligence and law enforcement efforts
to protect against terrorism and espionage. ' 56 The enactment of dozens
of criminal prohibitions on terrorist activities and espionage has added to
the contexts in which surveillance may simultaneously be contemplated
for intelligence gathering and law enforcement purposes. On the other
hand, despite the blurring of previously sharper lines between intelli-
gence collection and law enforcement, FISA's special set of procedures
remains the seminal authority when the government's purpose is that of
gathering foreign intelligence. As the Senate Intelligence Committee
report opined in 1984, "the Justice Department should use Title III when
it is clear that the main concern with respect to a terrorist group is
domestic law enforcement and criminal prosecution, even if the surveil-
53. See H.R. REP. No. 95-7308 (1978) ("[b]ecause the bill instead establishes authorities and
procedures dealing with the collection of foreign intelligence, the committee believes that its
proper placement would be in title 50").
54. See id. (emphasizing that a U.S. citizen "should be able to know that his government
cannot invade his privacy with the most intrusive techniques if he conducts himself lawfully.").
55. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978: The First Five Years, S. REP. No. 98-
660 at 14 (1984) [hereinafter First Five Years] ("FISA surveillance would be ...part of an
investigative process often designed to protect against the commission of serious crimes such as
... terrorist acts .... Intelligence and law enforcement tend to merge in this area.").
56. Supplemental Brief of the Department of Justice for the United States at 8, In re Sealed
Case, 310 F.3d 717 (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Ct. Rev. 2002) (No. 02-001).
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lance will also produce some foreign intelligence information."57 And
although the Patriot Act changed the weighing of the relative importance
of foreign intelligence and prosecution objectives in surveillance, the
core focus on intelligence remains.
Whatever the functional overlap, the procedural differences
between surveillance and searches for law enforcement and for gather-
ing foreign intelligence are stark. FISA permits electronic surveillance
or search if the FISC finds that there is probable cause to believe that the
target of the surveillance is a foreign power or agent of a foreign
power. 8 Conversely, Title III permits electronic surveillance only
where there is probable cause to believe that "an individual is commit-
ting, has committed, or is about to commit" 59 a serious crime, and "par-
ticular communications concerning that offense will be obtained through
such interception."60 While FISA surveillance may be authorized for
ninety days, 6 Title III collection is limited to thirty days until renewal
before a judge is required.62
Normally, the target of FISA surveillance or a physical search is
not entitled to notice that the FISA-authorized activities occurred unless
the information obtained is used in a subsequent criminal prosecution.63
By contrast, criminal searches pursuant to the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure usually require immediate notice,64 and Title III surveillance
targets must be given notice within ninety days of termination. 65 More-
over, a criminal defendant that has been subject to FISA surveillance or
search is normally not entitled to review the background materials that
supported the FISC order - the application, affidavits, surveillance logs,
or statements from informants that supported the FISC order.66 No court
has in fact ordered disclosure. In law enforcement, however, criminal
defendants routinely obtain access to these types of documents.67 These
differences are attributable to the fact that Congress recognized that col-
lection of foreign intelligence requires secrecy, and believed that the dis-
57. First Five Years, supra note 55, at 15.
58. 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(3) (2000).
59. 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (2000).
60. Id. §§ 2518(3)(a)-(b) (2000).
61. 50 U.S.C. § 1805(d)(1) (2000). (The Patriot Act extended the permissible surveillance
time period to up to one year when targeting a foreign power, and up to 120 days when targeting
an agent of a foreign power). See also 50 U.S.C. § 1805(e)(1) (2000).
62. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (2000).
63. 50 U.S.C. §§1806(c), 1825(d) (2000).
64. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(d).
65. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d) (2000).
66. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1806(f), 1825(g) (2000). (A reviewing court reviews these materials ex
parte and in camera and only discloses them to the defendant "where disclosure is necessary to
make an accurate determination of the legality of the surveillance/search.").
67. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2518(9) (2000).
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tinct purposes of foreign intelligence surveillance merited a departure
from the strict criminal law standards, even for especially intrusive
surveillance.68
In July 1995, the Attorney General issued a directive concerning
the FISA law enforcement/intelligence overlap. 69 The 1995 Procedures
were adopted because back-channel coordination between intelligence
and law enforcement officials had grown, particularly during the Aldrich
Ames espionage investigation in 1993. This coordination reached the
point where the Justice Department's Office of Intelligence Policy and
Review (OIPR) - a gatekeeper between the criminal and intelligence
sides in FISA applications - advised the Attorney General that Ames'
lawyers could use an alleged close intelligence/law enforcement rela-
tionship in Ames' case to cast doubt on the primary purpose of the FISA
surveillance and possibly derail the prosecution. 70 Although Ames' plea
bargain resolved the immediate problem, the 1995 Procedures limited
the nature and extent of law enforcement/intelligence consultations
thereafter. Advice could still be given, but the advice should "not inad-
vertently result in either the fact or the appearance of the Criminal Divi-
sion's directing or controlling" an investigation.7'
Apparently, however, the 1995 guidelines were misunderstood
within the Department. OIPR lawyers interpreted FISA as practically
forbidding contact between intelligence officials and criminal investiga-
tors. As the General Accounting Office later reported, intelligence coor-
dination with law enforcement dropped off after issuance of the 1995
guidelines, and the contact that did occur came so late in the process as
to be practically useless.72 According to another Justice Department
report, the restrictions imposed in practice by OIPR prevented the FBI
from obtaining "meaningful advice from the Criminal Division during
an FCI [foreign counterintelligence] investigation. 73  During this
period, the FBI developed a parallel system of "dirty" teams for intelli-
gence gathering and "clean" teams for law enforcement. They could
68. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 95-701, at 12-15 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3973,
3980-81, 3983.
69. Memorandum from the Attorney General, Procedures for Contacts Between the FBI and
Criminal Division Concerning Foreign Intelligence and Foreign Counterintelligence
Investigations (July 19, 1995) [hereinafter 1995 Procedures].
70. STEPHEN Dycus, ARTHUR BERNEY, WILLIAM C. BANKS & PETER RAVEN-HANSEN,
NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 679-80 (3d ed. 2002).
71. Id. at I A6 (emphasis added).
72. See Shelby Report, supra note 1, at 49 (citing GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
COORDINATION WITHIN JUSTICE ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE CRIMINAL MATrERS IS LIMITED
(2001)).
73. Id. (citing Department of Justice, Final Report of the Attorney General's Review Team on
the Handling of the Los Alamos National Laboratory Investigation, (May 2000), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/readingroom/bellows/htm.
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work at the same time on the same targets, yet they rarely talked to one
another."4 The "walls" were effectively erected by OIPR whenever an
intelligence investigation revealed some indication of criminal activity.
Between 1995 and 2002, the FISA procedures were augmented on
a few occasions to permit more information sharing between those seek-
ing foreign intelligence and the Criminal Division. Among other things,
the procedures permitted the reporting of reasonable indications of sig-
nificant federal crimes to the Criminal Division, consulting between the
Criminal Division and national security personnel, and providing gui-
dance to the FBI "aimed at preserving the option of criminal prosecu-
tion," although the Criminal Division was not allowed "to direct or
control the FISA investigation. 75 Throughout this period, the FISC
relied on and approved the new FISA procedures. Where there were
separate intelligence and law enforcement investigations of the same tar-
get or targets, or a single investigation with overlapping intelligence and
law enforcement interests, the FISC approved case-specific information
screening "walls" proposed by the government in its FISA applications.
The wall mechanisms ranged from the simple - preventing criminal
investigators or prosecutors from having access to raw FISA materials,
and having a neutral screener review the raw material and pass along
only the materials that might become pertinent evidence in a prosecution
- to the complex - where the FISC itself served as the wall, such as
during investigations involving the bombing of the Africa embassies in
1998 where criminal and intelligence investigations were going on in the
United States and abroad concurrently and prosecution was a likely
objective from the start.76
As espionage and terrorism incidents and threats against U.S. inter-
ests escalated, pressure on the wall began to build. In 1999, the high-
profile and ultimately embarrassing Wen Ho Lee espionage investiga-
tion prompted the Attorney General to commission a review team to
assess the Lee investigation and to make recommendations concerning,
among other things, FISA.77 Headed by Assistant U.S. Attorney Randy
Bellows, the team concluded that the FBI should have sought and
obtained FISA surveillance of Dr. Lee, and that OIPR conservatism in
reviewing FISA applications caused the Department to insist on more
74. Id. at 50 (citing Roberto Suro, FBI's 'Clean' Team Follows 'Dirty' Work of Intelligence,
WASH. POST, Aug. 16, 1999, at A13).
75. In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 218 F. Supp.
2d 611, 619 (U.S. Foreign Intell. Surveil. Ct. 2002) [hereinafter FISC Decision].
76. Id. at 620.
77. See Department of Justice, Final Report of the Attorney General's Review Team on the
Handling of the Los Alamos National Laboratory Investigation (May 2000) [hereinafter Bellows
Report], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/readingroom/bellows/htm.
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probable cause than the law requires.
Then came September 11. The post-September 11 finger pointing
included allegations that the wall had stood in the way of sharing infor-
mation that might have slowed or thwarted the terrorist attacks. Most
prominent are recurring allegations that FBI adherence to the wall pre-
vented authorities from learning enough about alleged hijacker Zacarias
Moussaoui in the summer of 2001 to have prevented the September 11
attacks. Moussaoui arrived in the United States on a French passport
and first enrolled in flight training in Oklahoma.79 After some weeks, he
dropped out of the Oklahoma program and moved to Minnesota, where
he sought flight training at a school that had a simulator for large pas-
senger airliners.80 FBI field agents reportedly learned that he paid for
flight training in cash, that he was not a good pupil, and that he showed
interest in learning how to fly commercial airliners. Although he was by
then subject to unobtrusive physical observation, no search of his home,
computer, or other possessions took place, nor was any electronic sur-
veillance conducted. Minneapolis field office FBI agents wanted to
examine his computer and personal papers after he was taken into gov-
ernment custody for overstaying his tourist visa, but the law enforce-
ment investigators had no probable cause to believe that he was engaged
in, or was about to engage in, criminal activity. FBI Headquarters ini-
tially considered seeking a warrant for a law enforcement search.
Simultaneously, however, Headquarters also prohibited the field agents
from notifying the Headquarters Criminal Division, fearing that any
interest expressed in a criminal warrant and prosecution could jeopard-
ize the chances of obtaining a FISA order.
The Minneapolis agents decided against seeking a traditional law
enforcement warrant, apparently because of doubts about being able to
meet the probable cause standard. Instead, they sought permission to
request a FISA order on the assumption that the probable cause showing
is easier to demonstrate before the FISC.81 However, when FBI field
agents sought permission to use the FISA procedures to enable secret
gathering of intelligence information, they were again denied by Head-
quarters on the grounds that the Bureau lacked sufficient information
connecting Moussaoui to any foreign power.82 Although field agents
submitted a lengthy written request to Headquarters, the agents at Head-
78. See id. at 492 (cited in STAFF OF SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, FBI OVERSIGHT: FISA
IMPLEMENTATION FAILURES at 23-24 (Feb. 2003), (interim report submitted by Senators Leahy,
Grassley, and Spector) [hereinafter Interim Report].
79. See Joint Inquiry Staff Memorandum, supra note 17, at 14.
80. Id. at 15.
81. Id. at 16.
82. Id. at 17.
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quarters only orally briefed the lawyers responsible for making the for-
eign agency recommendation. In addition, the Headquarters agents did
not conduct any computer searches for information that may have been
relevant to the Moussaoui request. If they had, then agents could have
had access to a July 2001 memorandum from the FBI special agent in
Phoenix regarding both the Usama bin Laden Unit and the Radical Fun-
damentalist Unit within the FBI counterterrorist infrastructure. The
memorandum warned about potential dangers from Al Qaeda affiliates
training at U.S. flight schools. Agency personnel apparently decided not
to follow up on the memorandum, and no managers or senior officials
saw the memorandum before September 11. 83
If the document had been shared and considered, it would certainly
have added context to Moussaoui's conduct, and been relevant toward a
finding of probable cause.84 To make matters worse, the FBI attorneys
apparently misled the Minneapolis agents in advising that FISA required
evidence that Moussaoui had connections to a recognized terrorist
organization, one on the list of State Department terrorist organiza-
tions.85 After three weeks of searching, French intelligence officials
reported to the FBI only an unconfirmed account that Moussaoui once
traveled with a French Muslim acquaintance to fight in the new jihad
against Russia in Chechnya.86 On September 11, after the attacks, the
Minneapolis agents were able to obtain a criminal search warrant to
search Moussaoui's computer and personal effects. Except for taking
note of the attacks, an admittedly significant development, the applica-
tion contained the same information that had been previously deter-
mined to be insufficient to meet FISA requirements.87
Although the FBI has been subject to much scapegoating for the
perceived missed opportunity with Moussaoui, the responsible legal
advisers at the Bureau were simply paying close attention to their legal
authority. It was the agents and junior lawyers at FBI Headquarters who
apparently insisted, with no legal basis, that foreign agency be found on
the basis of connections to a recognized terrorist group, much less an
organization designated as such by the Secretary of State.88 What did
have legal support, however, was the senior agents' understanding that
"agent of a foreign power" is a fact-based inquiry, tied to terrorist activ-
ity; the one unconfirmed report in FBI possession that Moussaoui had
83. Shelby Report, supra note 1, at 29-30.
84. Interim Report, supra note 78, at 15-16, 26.
85. Shelby Report, supra note 1, at 53; see also id, at 20.
86. Seymour M. Hersh, The Twentieth Man, THE NEW YORKER, Sept. 30, 2002, at 56.
87. Interim Report, supra note 78, at 17.
88. Shelby Report, supra note 1, at 53.
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urged another French Muslim to fight in Chechnya counted as an attenu-
ated stretch, at best, toward a finding of foreign agency.
Still, when Attorney General Ashcroft sought additional authority
to investigate terrorist threats in the weeks after September 11, Congress
was compliant. Former general counsel of the National Security Agency
Stewart Baker complained that "barriers to information-sharing between
intelligence and law enforcement agencies have already cost us dearly in
the fight against terror."89  Officials reasonably maintained that
counterterrorism investigations are now, more than ever, simultaneously
expected to be concerned with prevention of terrorist activities and
apprehension of criminal terrorists.
In the rush to "do something" in response to September 11 and to
accommodate the demands of the administration for greater authority,
Congress passed the 352-page USA Patriot Act9° after only a few weeks
of hearings and limited debate. The Act amended FISA in a few particu-
lar respects, and two sections effectively lowered the barrier between
law enforcement and intelligence gathering in seeking FISA orders.
Instead of foreign intelligence collection being "the purpose" (inter-
preted as "primary purpose") of the surveillance, it now must be only a
"significant purpose" of the search or wiretap.9 Congress also added an
information-sharing provision to FISA. The new section permits the
officials who conduct electronic surveillance to acquire foreign intelli-
gence to "consult with Federal law enforcement officers to coordinate
efforts to investigate or protect against" terrorist activities by foreign
powers or their agents.92 The same section states that such coordination
"shall not preclude" the government's certification that a "significant
purpose" of the surveillance requested is to obtain foreign intelligence
information.93
The imperative to act swiftly after September 11 meant that no one,
and certainly not Congress, gave careful consideration to a comprehen-
sive review of FISA or intelligence authorities generally. FISA was
largely untouched by the Patriot Act, and its essence remains foreign
intelligence collection. Perhaps cognizant that the intelligence gather-
ing/law enforcement roles would be further blended and merged in light
of the Patriot Act changes, the FISC responded to the first set of FISA
applications filed under the revised Act, in November 2001, by formaliz-
89. Stewart Baker, Grand Jury Secrecy Rules Help the Terrorists, WALL ST. J., Oct. 5, 2001,
at A14.
90. Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
91. Id. at § 218, 115 Stat. 272, 291 (amending 50 U.S.C. §§ 1804(a)(7)(B), 1823 (a)(7)(B)).
92. Id., at § 504(a), 115 Stat. 272, 364-365 (amending 50 U.S.C. § 1806(k)(1)).
93. 50 U.S.C. § 1806(k)(2) (2000) (amended by USA Patriot Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-
56, 115 Stat. 272, 364-65 (2001)).
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ing the augmented 1995 Department of Justice Procedures as "minimi-
zation procedures" to apply to all future applications to the FISC.
To reduce the risk that FISA surveillance could interfere with pri-
vacy rights, the Act has since 1978 required that procedures be adopted
by the Attorney General and followed to the satisfaction of the FISC to
"minimize the acquisition and retention, and prohibit the dissemination"
of nonpublic information about U.S. persons. 94 Although the procedures
are classified, they include some standard review mechanisms and some
situation-specific assessments. 95 FISA prohibits disclosure of FISA-
derived information except as provided by the minimization proce-
dures,96 although another section authorizes dissemination of FISA
material for law enforcement purposes that is also evidence of a crime.9 7
The effect of the November 2001 FISC order was to transform the Jus-
tice Department procedures that had been subject to case-by-case adjust-
ments into binding procedures that govern every FISA application.
Despite the FISC order, the Department of Justice issued March
2002 Intelligence Sharing Procedures designed to supersede prior proce-
dures to take into account the "significant" purpose and information
sharing amendments to FISA. The Procedures parrot the Patriot Act and
claim that the Act "allows FISA to be used primarily for a law enforce-
ment purpose, as long as a significant foreign intelligence purpose
remains.' 9 The March 2002 Procedures also permit an exchange of a
"full range of information and advice" between intelligence and law
enforcement officials regarding "the initiation, operation, continuation,
or expansion of FISA searches or surveillance," and providing that such
coordination "shall not" preclude the certification to the FISC of a sig-
nificant foreign intelligence purpose.9 9
IV. THE MAY 2002 FISC OPINION
Following approval by the Attorney General of the March 2002
procedures, the Department of Justice certified an application for sur-
veillance to the FISC and, as part of the application, also moved that the
FISC vacate its minimization and "wall" procedures to the extent they
are inconsistent with the new Department procedures. For the most part,
94. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801(h), 1805(a)(4) (2000).
95. William C. Banks & M.E. Bowman, Executive Authority for National Security
Surveillance, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 89 (2000).
96. 50 U.S.C. § 1806(a) (2000).
97. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(h)(3) (2000).
98. Memorandum from the Attorney General, Intelligence Sharing Procedures for Foreign
Intelligence and Foreign Counterintelligence Investigations Conducted by the FBI 2 (Mar. 6,
2002).
99. Id.
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the FISC judges agreed. Although the public did not know about the
court's decision until a nearly unprecedented °00 public statement in
August 2002, all ten judges then on the FISC,'0 ' along with the past
presiding judge of the FISC, agreed to publish an opinion of May 17,
signed by all seven judges of the FISC.10 2
Accepting the Department of Justice invitation, the FISC ordered
that the March 2002 procedures be adopted as minimization procedures
to apply in all cases. However, the court also ordered modifications to
those procedures, based on its interpretation of FISA. The FISC styled
its partial repudiation of the DOJ procedures as a straightforward appli-
cation of the requirements for minimization of the acquisition, retention,
and dissemination of information obtained through electronic surveil-
lances and physical searches of U.S. persons. In the opinion of the
FISC, the proposed Justice Department procedures would not adequately
minimize the uses of information obtained through FISA processes.
Because the court determined that the Department's procedures did not
comply with the necessary minimization requirements, the FISC did not
respond directly to the Department arguments that the Patriot Act
amendments to FISA authorized the changed procedures in their
entirety.
As the FISC perceived the Justice Department's proposed proce-
dures, the FISC would now be balancing the use of FISA materials
"against the government's need to obtain and use evidence for criminal
prosecution,"'' 3 instead of using minimization principles to determine
the "need of the United States to obtain, produce, and disseminate for-
eign intelligence information."" According to the FISC, portions of
the Department's procedures would permit the existing useful coordina-
tion among intelligence and law enforcement agencies to become subor-
dination of the former to the latter. Although the Patriot Act authorizes
consultation between intelligence and law enforcement officers to "coor-
dinate efforts to investigate or protect against" foreign threats to national
100. In 1981, in FISC's only previous public statement, Presiding Judge Hart issued a brief
opinion for the FISC affirming that the court had no jurisdiction to issue warrants for physical
searches. See In the Matter of the Application of the United States for an Order Authorizing the
Physical Search of Nonresidential Premises and Personal Property (198 1).
101. That ten judges approved publication of an opinion signed by seven judges reflected an
increase in the number of judges sanctioned by the Patriot Act. See USA Patriot Act of 2001, Pub.
L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272, 283 § 208 (2001) (amending 50 U.S.C. 1803(a)).
102. FISC Decision, 218 F. Supp. 2d 611 (2002). The May 17 Order was subsequently
incorporated and implemented in a July 19, 2002, decision denying a FISA application in Case
Number 02-662. See United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Ct. of Rev., Hearing
Transcript 5 (Sept. 9, 2002) (No. 02-001) [hereinafter Hearing Transcript].
103. FISC Decision, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 624.
104. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801(h), 1821(4) (2003).
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security,' 05 the limits drawn by the FISC on Department of Justice pro-
cedures seek to avoid FISA activities where "criminal prosecutors direct
both the intelligence and criminal investigations ... [and] coordination
becomes subordination of both investigations or interests to law enforce-
ment objectives.' ' 6 The court explained what it viewed as the danger-
ous implications of the DOJ procedures:
[C]riminal prosecutors will tell the FBI when to use FISA (perhaps
because they lack probable cause for a Title III electronic surveil-
lance),what techniques to use, what information to look for, what
information to keep as evidence and when use of FISA can cease
because there is enough evidence to arrest and prosecute.10 7
The FISC judges worried that under the DOJ's procedures, prosecutors
would have "every legal advantage conceived by Congress to be used by
U.S. intelligence agencies to collect foreign intelligence information,"
including the lesser probable cause standard, use of "the most highly
advanced and intrusive techniques for intelligence gathering," and dis-
cretion to carry on surveillances and searches for a long time.'0 8 All of
these powers could be employed after finding only "that the U.S. person
is . . . using or about to use the places to be surveilled and searched,
without any notice to the target unless arrested and prosecuted, and, if
prosecuted, no adversarial discovery of the FISA applications and war-
rants."' 09 After concluding that it was not persuaded that criminal pros-
ecutors needed such intrusive means to obtain foreign intelligence
information, the en banc FISC struck two paragraphs of the DOJ proce-
dures (those permitting prosecutors to advise FBI intelligence officials
concerning "the initiation, operation, continuation, or expansion of FISA
searches or surveillance") and replaced them with the "bright line" lan-
guage similar to the 1995 admonition that law enforcement personnel
should not "direct or control" the use of FISA procedures, along with a
requirement that consultations and coordination be monitored by
OIPR. "1o
The essence of the FISC decision was to order preservation of the
foreign intelligence objective of FISA. Thus, the FISC order that the
Criminal Division not make recommendations concerning "the initia-
tion, operation, continuation or expansion" of FISA surveillance or
searches, that prosecutors not "direct or control ... to enhance criminal
105. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1806(k), 1825(k) (2000).
106. FISC Decision, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 623-24.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 611.
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prosecution,""1 I and that it not recommend that an existing FISA search
or surveillance be conducted in a particular way or be in pursuit of par-
ticular information was an attempt by the court to preserve the distinc-
tion between law enforcement and foreign intelligence objectives in
carrying out FISA activities that Congress enshrined in FISA in 1978.
Likewise, what became known as the "chaperone" requirement, that the
OIPR had to "be invited" to participate whenever law enforcement and
intelligence officials consult on a FISA matter,'12 reflected a well-
intended if cumbersome desire to monitor what remained of the protec-
tive wall between law enforcement and intelligence gathering. If OIPR
representatives were unable to attend the meetings, the procedures as
approved by the FISC required that OIPR be "apprized of the substance
of the meetings forthwith in writing so that the [FISC] may be notified at
the earliest opportunity."' 13
The FISC choice to base its decision on the minimization require-
ments in FISA became an easy target for the government and the FISCR
on appeal of the FISC decision. Although the 2002 Justice Department
procedures, as amended by the FISC, are designed to meet the demands
for minimization under FISA, the FISC decision likely would have been
more difficult to overturn had the judges responded directly to the
Patriot Act claims made by the DOJ. To be sure, all seven judges left
little doubt that they would have culled out the same few offensive por-
tions of the DOJ procedures in directly responding to the Patriot Act
amendments. 14 Still, those less-versed in FISA than the seven judges
(that means almost everyone else, including the FISCR and the
media)" '5 had a difficult time understanding how an express authoriza-
tion for information sharing and a change in the "purpose" standard in
the Patriot Act could be defeated by requirements for minimization.
Worse yet, one reading of the FISC decision is that the court attempted
to duck the effects of the Patriot Act amendments. While this tactical
judgment by the FISC was certainly questionable, the court made plain
why it thought the few restrictions it imposed on DOJ were consistent
with FISA and were perhaps required by the Fourth Amendment.
On the one hand, the concern exposed by the May 17 FISC opinion
is easy to envision after stripping away the technical questions of statu-
Ill. Id.
112. FISCR Opinion, 310 F.3d at 730.
113. Id. at 625.
114. FISC Decision, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 611 ("the proposed... procedures eliminate the bright
line ... prohibiting direction and control by prosecutors ...").
115. For an illustration of the media's immediate response to the FISCR Opinion, see A Green
Light to Spy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2002, at A30; Chipping Away at Liberty, WASH. POST, Nov.
19, 2002, at A24.
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tory interpretation: prosecutors may seek to use FISA to end-run the
traditional law enforcement warrant procedures. While they understand-
ably gain flexibility that way, they also become less accountable to the
Constitution and courts, and anyone in the United States could be sub-
ject to surveillance and later arrested and detained without the protec-
tions afforded by the criminal justice system. On the other hand, the
FISC analysis and subsequent reversal on appeal were unquestionably
colored by the recent history of mistrust between the Justice Department
and the FISC. The FISC reacted to alleged abuses and inadequate man-
agement of FISA activities within the Department. The FISC created a
cumbersome set of procedures and monitoring requirements that contrib-
uted to the compromise of essential agency coordination among intelli-
gence and law enforcement officials.
V. THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT OF
REVIEW (FISCR) DECISION
Along with its May 17 opinion, the FISC adopted a rule of court
procedure that requires all FISA applications to "include informative
descriptions of any ongoing criminal investigations of FISA targets, as
well as the substance of any consultations between the FBI and criminal
prosecutors." 16 Defying the May 17 order, the government proposed in
a new application to the FISC on July 19 to use their proposed March
2002 Procedures without modification." 7 Although the FISC judge
granted the application, the order modified the Procedures consistent
with the May 17 order.' 8 The modification formed the basis for the
appeal to the FISCR. "9 On September 9, 2002, the nation's most secret
appellate court, the three-judge Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
of Review (FISCR), met for the first time in its twenty-four year history
to consider the first appeal from a decision of the FISC. The three
senior status federal judges, appointed as prescribed in FISA on a rotat-
ing basis by the Chief Justice, had no experience with FISA or the FISC.
Nor had any of them presided over such an explicitly one-sided appeal.
As presiding Judge Ralph B. Guy observed, the hearing "is a strange
proceeding because it is not adversarial .... One might think that the
adversary... is [the FISC].' 12 0 The Justice Department confirmed that
the hearing took place only after congressional staffers and civil liberties
groups complained that they were denied access to or a chance to par-
116. See FISC Decision, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 627 (where the Court promulgated Rule 11,
Criminal Investigations in FISA Cases).
117. FISCR Opinion, 310 F.3d at 730.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 729-30.
120. Hearing Transcript, supra note 102, at 100.
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ticipate in the hearing. Only Department representatives and the three
judges were present at the hearing, where the government's argument
was made by Solicitor General Theodore B. Olson. 2' Obviously struck
by the absence of an opposing side, Judge Laurence H. Silberman asked
Olson for his view of whether the FISCR should accept amicus briefs
from groups supporting the FISC decision.' 22 Olson replied "that it's
probably good" for the court to receive the briefs.' 23
In an opinion issued on November 18, the unanimous FISCR
reversed the en banc FISC and held that the restrictions on criminal
division use of FISA procedures imposed by the FISC are not required
by FISA or the Constitution.1 24 I believe that the court misread FISA
and the Constitution but minimized the harm its analysis caused by rest-
ing its decision on a fallback position of the government, which both
leaves room for future compromise and invites reforms. The reversal
was hardly surprising given all the forces aligned on one side of this
appeal. However, the unfortunate rhetoric of the FISCR opinion, along
with some comments made at the appeal hearing by counsel and thejudges concerning the government's missing chances to stop terrorism in
general, and September 11 in particular, because of its misunderstanding
of FISA, obscured two important realities: (1) that there is not considera-
ble difference between what the FISC ordered and what the Justice
Department wanted; and (2) FISA remains, at its core, an extraordinary
mechanism that permits the government to seek foreign intelligence
information. To the extent problems of coordination and cooperation
plague the intelligence community in its use of FISA, they are more
institutional and cultural than legal. Reforms of the institutional culture
would better ensure counterterrorism objectives than stretching the legal
safeguards of FISA would.
The very fact of the appeal, along with the selection of Solicitor
General Olson to argue for the government, underscores the Depart-
ment's view that the dispute with the FISC was high-stakes. According
to the Department's FISA expert, Associate Deputy Attorney General
David Kris,
[A]t stake is nothing less than our ability to protect this country from
foreign spies and terrorists .... We need all of our best people,
intelligence and law enforcement alike, working together to neutral-
ize the threat. In some cases, the best protection is prosecution ... In
other cases ... another method - such as recruitment - is called for.
Sometimes you need to use both methods. But we can't make a
121. Philip Shenon, Secret Court Weighs Wiretaps, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2002, at A13.
122. Hearing Transcript, supra note 102, at 99-100.
123. Id. at 67-68. (The briefs were ultimately accepted by the court.)
124. FISCR Opinion, 310 F.3d at 719-20.
1172 [Vol. 57:1147
AND THE WALL CAME TUMBLING DOWN
rational decision until everyone is allowed to sit down together and
brainstorm about what to do.
125
Kris drew an analogy to medicine:
When someone has cancer, sometimes the best solution is surgery to
cut the tumor out. Other times it's chemotherapy. And in some cases
you need both. But who would go to a hospital where the doctors
can't sit down and talk to each other about what's best for the
patient? That's bad medicine. And that's what we're trying to
change. 126
The rhetoric of Kris's statement first appeals to our base instincts by
emphasizing the need for security from horrific acts of terrorists, and
then it wraps the security appeal in common sense language of a team
working together to provide the best options for the cancer patient.
Missing from Kris's statement, however, are two critical points of refer-
ence. First, Congress provided for the secretive FISA process as a
means to facilitate collection of foreign intelligence information, not for
any other purpose. Second, the Fourth Amendment requires a higher
threshold than FISA before permitting intrusive surveillance when crim-
inal prosecution is the government's aim. Thus, while the law gets in
the way of the government's ideal world, the modest legal barriers
erected by FISA and the Constitution do not stand in the way of having
"all of [the] best people .. .working together."'127 The only limits
imposed by FISA and by the now-overturned FISC procedures were pre-
vention of prosecutors from directing a FISA operation and insuring that
OIPR could "chaperone" operations where intelligence gathering and
criminal prosecution were simultaneous objectives of the surveillance.
While some of the details of the chaperone portion of the FISC order
may well have been an over-reaction to prior Justice Department mis-
deeds, its overall direction and control limits unquestionably serve the
very core objective of FISA, even as amended by the Patriot Act.
Moreover, Kris's medical treatment analogy misleads. The FISA
system in place before November did permit, indeed facilitate, the spe-
cialist doctors to consult on how best to treat the patient. But, when the
specialists sought to employ the shortcut of FISA surveillance, they had
to make sure that the FISA doctor was in charge of initiating and con-
trolling those procedures. They also had to be certain that the OIPR
surgeons were included in the discussion when the prosecution doctor
decided on surgery.
125. The USA PATRIOT Act In Practice: Shedding Light on the FISA Process: Before the S.
Judiciary Comm., 107th Congress 2d (2002) (Statement of David Kris, Associate Deputy Attorney
General) (emphasis added) [hereinafter Kris Statement].
126. Id. (emphasis added).
127. Id.
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As noted above, the FISC accepted the Department's March 2002
proposed procedures in every respect except one. It agreed that intelli-
gence officials may share virtually any information with law enforce-
ment personnel, indicating that the "team" members are indeed fully
informed of each other's activities and leads. What the Justice Depart-
ment did not get from the FISC was approval for law enforcement per-
sonnel to direct and control a FISA investigation. The practical effects
of this limited rejection of the proposed procedures are not self-evident,
and the Department's objection and the FISCR repudiation of the FISC
on this point smacks of overkill. The FISC-imposed "chaperone"
requirement caused the Department to complain that it is impractical to
insist on OIPR involvement in a fast-paced and often times widely dis-
persed investigation. Giving Justice the benefit of the doubt on this
issue, it is not clear that compromises would be unable to save some
form of a useful role for OIPR in overseeing these complex and highly
intrusive investigations. Although Kris analogized OIPR to a hospital
administrator who would be called in to the cancer consultation between
oncologist and surgeon, OIPR is more akin to an ombudsman for the
cancer patient, whose job is to make sure that the correct treatment is
prescribed.
A. The FISCR Opinion on "Primary Purpose"
After prodding by Judge Silberman during the September 9 FISCR
hearing, the government prepared a supplemental brief to support an
argument that Silberman actually outlined for Solicitor General Olson
during the hearing - that FISA never contained any restriction on the
government's use of FISA information in criminal prosecutions. 128
Applying this argument would mean that the dozens of courts of appeal
decisions that employed some kind of "primary purpose" analysis were,
according to Judge Silberman, simply wrong. 2 9 The hearing transcript
suggests that Silberman's tack took Olson and his colleagues by sur-
prise. When the FISCR considered the issue in its opinion, the court
acknowledged that the argument was not raised in the FISC, and that
Silberman's FISA theory had never been advanced before a court or
Congress. 130
Unschooled in FISA and its implementation in practice, the FISCR
fell into an analytic trap of its own making. The appeals court reasoned
that because FISA defines the targets and information to be sought with
128. See FISCR Opinion, 310 F.3d at 721; see also Hearing Transcript, supra note 102, at 33-
34.
129. FISCR Opinion, 310 F.3d at 722.
130. Id. at 721.
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close reference to criminal activity, any use of foreign intelligence infor-
mation derived from FISA activities, including prosecution, is permit-
ted. '3 The FISCR found it "quite puzzling"' 32 that the DOJ had, for
about twenty years, read FISA as imposing any limit on obtaining FISA
orders if its intent was to prosecute the targets. It is hardly credible that
the judges would be puzzled by a practice that had been supported as a
bedrock component of FISA by dozens of FISC judges and by Congress
for twenty-four years. What the FISCR called "an obvious reading of
the statutory language that foreign intelligence information includes evi-
dence of foreign intelligence crimes"133 was neither a new insight nor
probative of the limits on law enforcement's use of FISA.
Judicial decisions before and after the enactment of FISA reflect
the common understanding that law enforcement and intelligence gath-
ering interests will often overlap in investigations. The pre-Patriot Act
FISA case law limited the use of FISA procedures in law enforcement,
based on the language of FISA, the Truong decision that shaped the
subsequent case law, and the legislative history of FISA. It was not that
the courts treated the two categories - intelligence and prosecution - as
mutually exclusive. As illustrated by Truong, the primary purpose anal-
ysis necessarily involved a subjective inquiry into what considerations
were driving each investigation, and, therefore, the purpose of employ-
ing the technique as well.134
Moreover, in construing the case law following Truong, the FISCR
judges misapprehended what foreign intelligence information is actually
used for.' 35 That there was no discussion in seminal FISA decisions of
how the government would use its foreign intelligence outside prosecu-
tion efforts does not mean there is no such use, nor does it mean that the
government failed to benefit from what was obtained as intelligence
information. The cases cited by the FISCR 136 involved instances where
prosecution was sought. However, in many cases, the foreign intelli-
gence obtained through FISA is useful in a programmatic sense, or at
least constitutes a piece of a larger mosaic and does not lead to prosecu-
tion. Contrary to the FISCR assertion that "criminal prosecution analyti-
131. Id.
132. Id. at 723.
133. Id. at 724.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 726-27.
136. Id. at 726-27 (discussing and analyzing United States v. Megahey, 533 F. Supp. 1180
(E.D.N.Y. 1982), aff'd sub non United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59 (2d Cir. 1984); United
States v. Falvey, 540 F. Supp. 1306 (E.D.N.Y. 1982); United States v. Pelton, 835 F.2d 1067 (4th
Cir. 1987); United States v. Badia, 827 F.2d 1458 (11 th Cir. 1987); United States v. Johnson, 952
F.2d 565 (1st Cir. 1991); United States v. Sarkissian, 841 F.2d 959 (9th Cir. 1988)).
20031 1175
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
cally cannot be placed in a separate... category,"'' 37 the truth is that the
FBI had done exactly that for twenty-four years, under FISA.
What the government called a "false dichotomy"' 38 between law
enforcement and intelligence is hardly so in working out the reason or
reasons for seeking FISA surveillance. In practice, the FBI has man-
aged that dichotomy as well as can be expected under circumstances
where the reasons for intelligence gathering are multiple, mixed, and
ever-changing. The fact that the interests and uses blur and merge does
not relieve the government of its obligation to comply with FISA.
FISCR did not appreciate that the courts that have reviewed criminal
convictions where FISA supplied evidence for the prosecution have not
concluded that some involvement of law enforcement personnel in a
FISA intelligence investigation negated the intelligence purpose of the
investigation. The courts further failed to realize that the dual intelli-
gence and law enforcement roles of some FBI agents involved in FISA
surveillance resulted in the exclusion of evidence in subsequent criminal
prosecutions. In reversing the FISC decision, the FISCR simply missed
the mark when it conflated the way FISA information is used with the
purpose for using FISA.
According to the FISCR, evolving interpretations of the 1995 Pro-
cedures and the "directing or controlling" language that constrained per-
sonnel within the Department of Justice and perhaps specifically within
OIPR "prevented the Criminal Division from providing any meaningful
advice to the FBI."' 13 9 Those unfortunate interpretations of the Proce-
dures may indeed have seriously impeded FISA counterterrorism inves-
tigations before the Patriot Act. The Procedures themselves, however,
permitted very broad prosecution/intelligence cooperation and consulta-
tion and drew a line only in the most extreme cases - where the Crimi-
nal Division would initiate or take over a FISA investigation.
B. The FISCR on Minimization
The FISCR complained that the FISC opinion "does not clearly set
forth the basis for its decision."' 40 Unfortunately, the decision of the
FISC judges to review the proposed Justice Department procedures
against the FISA minimization requirements confused the FISCR, and
the failure of the FISC to respond directly to the Patriot Act amendments
provided a relatively easy path toward the FISCR reversal. It is more
137. FISCR Opinion, 310 F. 3d at 727.
138. Id. at 725.
139. Id. at 728 (paraphrasing the FINAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REVIEW TEAM
ON THE HANDLING OF THE Los ALAMOS NATIONAL LABORATORY INVESTIGATION 721-34 (May
2000)).
140. FISCR Opinion, 310 F.3d at 721.
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accurate to say that the FISC relied on its interpretation of the FISA
minimization requirements for its decision and rejected in part the DOJ
procedures as falling short of what FISA demands.
The FISCR correctly observed that minimization procedures are
designed to protect against the collection and dissemination of nonpublic
information. The rights-sensitive objective of minimization is appar-
ently what prompted the FISC to characterize its information-sharing
rules as minimization procedures. However, the FISCR wrongly con-
cluded that FISA requires minimization only of information that is not
foreign intelligence information.' 4
The minimization section of FISA contains three provisos. The
first is generic and requires
specific procedures ... that are reasonably designed in light of the
purpose and technique of the particular surveillance to minimize the
acquisition and retention, and prohibit the dissemination, of nonpub-
licly available information concerning nonconsenting United States
persons consistent with the need of the United States to obtain, pro-
duce, and disseminate foreign intelligence information.' 42
The second applies to information "which is not foreign intelligence
information,"' 43 while the third exempts from the first and second set of
requirements "information that is evidence of a crime . . . that is to be
retained or disseminated for law enforcement purposes." ''  The plain
meaning of the first proviso - non-publicly available "information" -
expressly covers foreign intelligence information. Thus, it is incorrect
for the FISCR to say "there is simply no basis for the FISA court's
reliance" on minimization to limit prosecutors' ability to "advise FBI
intelligence officials on the initiation, operation, continuation, or expan-
sion of FISA surveillances to obtain foreign intelligence information."' 45
Minimization may have not been the best vehicle for dealing with the
law enforcement/intelligence overlap, particularly after the Patriot Act,
but it is at least an understandable analysis, and defensible.
C. The FISCR and "Significant Purpose"
By misunderstanding the minimization requirements of FISA, the
FISCR got off on the wrong foot. Much of the controversy surrounding
the "wall," as noted previously, is based on what the Department of
Justice, and later the FISCR, characterized as a false dichotomy between
141. Id. at 731.
142. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(h)(1) (2000).
143. Id. § 1801(h)(2).
144. Id. § 1801(h)(3).
145. FISCR Opinion, 310 F.3d at 731.
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a foreign intelligence purpose and a law enforcement purpose. In one
sense, there is no dichotomy between law enforcement and collection of
foreign intelligence as FISA objectives. By FISA definition, the collec-
tion of foreign intelligence concerning U.S. persons involves looking for
information where it is thought that some sort of national security crime
may occur.146 It has also been clear, since the enactment of FISA in
1978, that "foreign intelligence information" may be evidence of a crime
that could be used in the prosecution of a national security crime.1 47
Regarding the intended purpose of the surveillance or search that is
requested pursuant to FISA since 1978, however, there has been, and
remains today, a dichotomy between law enforcement and intelligence.
Since 1978, the FISA mechanisms are available only when the purpose
(or, after enactment of the Patriot Act, a "significant purpose") of the
surveillance, for which FISC permission is sought, is to gather foreign
intelligence, even though the information collected may include evi-
dence of a crime and that such evidence could be used later in a criminal
prosecution.
The FISCR recognized that the new DOJ argument prompted by
Judge Silberman's questions during the appeal hearing was at odds with
its "significant purpose" argument. The court thus backed down slightly
from its first conclusion (that FISA should never have been read to limit
prosecution objectives) and decided that "the better reading" of FISA as
amended is to "exclude from the purpose of gaining foreign intelligence
information a sole objective of criminal prosecution."' 48 The court then
stated that there is little practical difference between these interpreta-
tions in most instances, so long as the government has not unequivocally
decided when an application to prosecute is made under FISA, and "a
realistic option" remains for dealing with the target in some other man-
ner. 4 9 The court concluded that if "the government's sole objective was
merely to gain evidence of past criminal conduct - even foreign intelli-
gence crimes - to punish the agent . . . the application should be
denied." 150
The change to "significant" purpose adopted in the Patriot Act
altered the balance in deciding whether to approve an application for
FISA surveillance or search. So long as a significant purpose of the
surveillance or search is to gather foreign intelligence, law enforcement
aims may also shape the request to the FISC. The Justice Department
maintained that the "significant" purpose amendment to FISA would
146. See 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e) (2001) (linking information sought and criminal conduct).
147. Id.
148. Id. at 735.
149. Id.
150. Id.
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affect a very small subset of cases, those where the target is an agent of a
foreign power and is committing an unrelated crime.1 5 1 One example
could be where an international terrorist is also a drug dealer - not to
support terrorist activities but to support himself. Gathering evidence
for a drug prosecution could not be the sole purpose of a FISA search.
But the government's position is based on a false premise. It fails to
recognize that seeking FISA surveillance of even a known agent of a
foreign power for the purpose of prosecuting a crime related to terrorism
(such as where drug dealing was used to fund terrorist activities) is also
subject to the "significant purpose" rule.
Although the Patriot Act did lower the wall between intelligence
and law enforcement, that wall was not removed, and the essence of
FISA as an exceptional procedure for the gathering of foreign intelli-
gence information remains. Each of the statutory definitions of "foreign
intelligence information" pertains to a category of intelligence that may
further the counterterrorism goals of law enforcement, but each defini-
tion also requires that the surveillance be for "information" that furthers
these purposes. Obtaining "evidence for conviction" is different from
obtaining "foreign intelligence information," even if the conviction will
deter terrorism. Although "foreign intelligence information" has always
included information that could be evidence of a crime, seeking that
information in order to prosecute is not the same as seeking that infor-
mation in order to prevent possible terrorist activities. A proper reading
of FISA reveals that the Criminal Division may not direct and control a
FISA investigation where the only objective is to prosecute the target.
The Department maintained in its brief that the "foreign intelli-
gence" definition does not limit how the government uses the informa-
tion it obtains to achieve the protections sought by FISA. 52 Protection
against the threats listed in FISA may be achieved in many ways, includ-
ing by prosecuting the alleged terrorist or spy. This assertion is true, so
long as the surveillance or search is lawful at the outset. Only if there is
a significant foreign intelligence purpose, certified by someone with
national security responsibility at the Justice Department, can the infor-
mation obtained be used later in a prosecution.
The most controversial issues do not concern consultation and
advice, but instead involve instances where the Criminal Division seeks
to initiate or direct an investigation in order to prosecute. The "direc-
tion and control" approach created by the FISC was designed to preserve
the underlying purpose of FISA - to collect foreign intelligence infor-
151. Kris Statement, supra note 125, at 7.
152. Brief for the United States at 14, In re Sealed Case Nos. 02-001, 02-002, 310 F.3d 717
(U.S. Foreign Intell. Surveil. Ct. Rev. 2002) (No.02-001) [hereinafter DOJ Brief].
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mation from agents of a foreign power in order to protect the United
States from terrorism and espionage threats. Like the "chaperone"
requirement, the direction and control limit supplies a prophylactic
against a prosecutor's making use of FISA in order to build a criminal
case.
The FISCR opinion is thus internally inconsistent. The court first
concluded that FISA never limited the use of foreign intelligence for law
enforcement purposes. Then it maintained that the Patriot Act amend-
ment imposes such a limit, albeit a lesser one than that which the court
says never existed! The court's opinion admitted that the Patriot Act
eliminated the "primary purpose" approach that the Justice Department,
the FISC, and all other Article III courts had been using to review
alleged misuses of FISA surveillance since pre-FISA days.
The FISCR did not specifically relate this unrecognized concession
to its conclusion that even "direction and control" can properly be in the
Criminal Division's hands. Apparently, the direction and control author-
ity could not be exercised if the "sole objective" is prosecution. How-
ever, in a given situation, the government may fully intend to prosecute
a spy or terrorist, but at the same time need to know with whom he is
involved, precisely what he has done, whether others are complicit, and
whether he or his co-conspirators can be "turned." Thus, there may be a
logical and lawful time for the prosecutor to control the nature of the
FISA targeting because the prosecution may have to be structured in
such a way that the government can avoid giving notice that FISA sur-
veillance was conducted.
Finally, the FISCR compounded its misapprehension of FISA when
it declared that the FISC has no authority to "inquire into which Justice
Department officials were instigators of an investigation" in reviewing a
certification under FISA.153 The FISCR also charged that, in making
such an inquiry, the FISC "may well have exceeded the constitutional
bounds that restrict an Article III court" by telling the Department of
Justice "how to deploy personnel resources," 154 a function reserved by
the Constitution to the Executive or to Congress. 155 However, as the
former Counsel for Intelligence Policy testified in Senate hearings in
September 2002, regardless of the "purpose" language, the FISA
requirement that an official "employed in the area of national secur-
ity" 156 make the certification underscores that FISA surveillance was to
be undertaken only when a national security objective for the surveil-
153. FISCR Opinion, 310 F.3d at 736.
154. Id. at 731.
155. Id.
156. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1804(a)(7)(A-B) (2000).
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lance is present.'57 Contrary to the FISCR assertion that "[t]here is
nothing in FISA or the Patriot Act that suggests otherwise,"' 58 FISA
further underscores the intelligence gathering purpose of these special
authorities by insisting that a national security official, not a prosecutor
or criminal investigator, make the relevant certification. The FISA
assignment is ministerial, prescribed by Congress, not the FISC. FISA
clearly supplies the legal authority for making the ultimate certification
decisions.
D. The FISCR and the Fourth Amendment
The FISCR characterized the FISC decision as reflecting the opin-
ion that "Title III procedures are constitutionally mandated if the gov-
ernment has a prosecutorial objective regarding an agent of a foreign
power."' 59 This characterization is not quite correct. The FISC would
remit the government to Title III if it were seeking to employ FISA
when its only objective was to build a criminal case.
The Department of Justice brief inaccurately characterized the
Keith decision as drawing the constitutional boundaries for surveillance
on the basis of the "nature of the threat, not the nature of the govern-
ment's response to that threat."' 60 In fact, both elements figured in
Keith's balancing formula. The Supreme Court recognized that different
standards might be constitutional "if they are reasonable both in relation
to the legitimate need of Government for intelligence information and
the protected rights of our citizens."' 6'   The Court emphasized that the
government's duty to protect the national security was pitted against the
danger that unmonitored executive surveillance would abuse individual
rights.
The Keith Court supported an exception to the warrant requirement
because it may be "reasonable" under the Fourth Amendment to use
other procedures in pursuit of intelligence information. 62 FISA occu-
pied the exception recognized by the Supreme Court, leaving the law
enforcement model in place. FISA did not negate the warrant require-
ment itself. Although it is common to refer to what the FISC issues as
"warrants," they have that label not because they are Fourth Amendment
warrants, but rather because the FISC permits the type of surveillance
157. See The Delicate - and Difficult - Balance of Intelligence and Criminal Prosecution
Interests in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, Before the Senate Judiciary Comm. (Sept.
10, 2002) available at 2002 WL 31013657 (statement of Kenneth C. Bass, III).
158. FISCR Opinion, 310 F.3d at 736.
159. Id. at 737.
160. DOJ Brief, supra note 152.
161. Keith, 407 U.S. at 322-23.
162. See Banks & Bowman, supra note 95, at 52.
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associated with a Title III warrant. Left to its own devices, the govern-
ment might invoke the unprecedented "war on terrorism" and permit the
national security exception to serve the purpose of gathering evidence
for conviction, collapsing the careful distinction endorsed by the Court
in Keith. Allowing the government to employ FISA when the sole
objective is to enforce the criminal laws, however, would be unconstitu-
tional, in violation of Fourth Amendment protections.
The FISCR compared Title III and FISA thresholds and procedures
and asserted that the differences are not constitutionally significant. To
say that the statutes differ to some extent in their probable cause show-
ings seriously understates those differences, as the FISC decision made
clear. The Court ignored the fact that FISA surveillance and searches
may be constitutionally reasonable precisely because they are available
when the government is collecting information for foreign intelligence
purposes. The FISCR conclusion that FISA may not be employed if the
sole objective of the surveillance or search is prosecution means that the
FISA/Title III distinction must be observed at least in those instances.
Arguably, the same analysis should govern an ongoing investigation,
meaning that when the Justice Department determines that the only rea-
son to continue FISA surveillance is to prosecute, Title III procedures
should be followed.
The FISCR conclusion that the amended FISA satisfies the Fourth
Amendment's reasonableness requirement is itself tenable only if FISA
is construed to forbid the Criminal Division from using FISA to engi-
neer prosecution. Applying the traditional canon of constitutional avoid-
ance, the narrow construction should be applied to save the statute's
constitutionality. FISA should not be used simply in order to prosecute,
but its procedures may be used to obtain foreign intelligence in circum-
stances where Title III might not be a practical alternative. In such situ-
ations, the prosecutor participates in FISA in order to enhance the entire
government's options, not merely those of the Criminal Division.
The government brief to the FISCR argued that, before the Patriot
Act, federal courts treated law enforcement and intelligence gathering
purposes "as if the two terms are mutually exclusive."' 63 The historical
record belies this assertion. Far from separating the two, the "primary
purpose" standard recognized the frequent overlap of law enforcement
and intelligence operations, and sought to draw a reasonable line to
guide law enforcement and intelligence officials as they manage parallel
investigations. 164
163. DOJ Brief, supra note 152, at 20.
164. See, e.g., United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 1980); United States
v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59 (2d Cir. 1984).
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Picking up on the government's argument, the FISCR accused the
Truong court of drawing a line between intelligence and law enforce-
ment that "was inherently unstable, unrealistic, and confusing.' 65
Admittedly, this pre-FISA decision could not have foreseen the growing
threat of terrorism and the necessary merging of intelligence and law
enforcement interests in combating terrorism. The court's Troung anal-
ysis was "unstable" in that respect. Yet in FISA, Congress soon sup-
plied the necessary stability to manage the overlap and thus greatly
affected the Fourth Amendment calculus.
It was never true, as the FISCR said it might have been when
Truong was decided, that "foreign policy concerns recede"1 66 once the
prosecution interests become dominant. 67 Still, the Truong approach
had not otherwise proven unworkable until it was changed by Congress
through the Patriot Act. In fact, the organizational division of the Justice
Department into criminal and intelligence compartments helped the
reviewing court determine the purpose of the surveillance or search. It
also served the same end for the FISC, and worked reasonably well
within the Department to maintain a wall when one was needed. To the
extent that the information sharing broke down, the legal standard was
not the cause. Contrary to the FISCR assertion that the "primary pur-
pose" standard may itself be "dangerous to national security" because it
"punishes . . . cooperation,"'' 68 the existing standard protected Fourth
Amendment interests while it provided a workable framework for coop-
eration among intelligence and law enforcement officials.
Even though arresting or prosecuting a potential terrorist "may well
be the best technique"'' 69 for attaining the prevention goals of the intelli-
gence community, it is not determinative of the procedures that must be
followed before the surveillance or search is conducted. Government
agents may well be in pursuit of "foreign intelligence information" as
defined in FISA, the target may be an "agent of a foreign power," and
the information sought may concern "international terrorism" as defined
in FISA. But, if the Criminal Division is setting out to prosecute, FISA
may not be used unless (following the Patriot Act) there is also a "signif-
icant" intelligence gathering purpose. The procedures in FISA and Title
III are different for two important reasons: First, the higher stakes for
the target of law enforcement investigations merit greater assurance that
the investigators are close to nabbing criminals, and second, the impreci-
sion and long-term nature of preventive intelligence gathering, where
165. FISCR Opinion, 310 F.3d at 743.
166. Truong, 629 F.2d at 915.
167. FISCR Opinion, 310 F.3d at 743.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 724.
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targets are often not identifiable by the government in advance of sur-
veillance, suggest different considerations in reviewing an application
for surveillance. Government agents must select the "best technique"
with these constraints in mind.
Finally, the FISCR analogized the revised FISA to situations where
the Supreme Court has approved warrantless searches that were
designed to meet the government's "special needs, beyond the normal
need for law enforcement."'' 7 0 However, the analogy fails for the same
reason that the FISCR's efforts to minimize the differences between
Title III and FISA procedures come up short: the "special needs" cases
-searches for drugs in the school lockers, or immigration checkpoints at
the nation's borders - are not primarily concerned with law enforcement
objectives. Nor is FISA a law enforcement tool, and the Supreme
Court's "special needs" cases cut against, rather than for, the FISCR
analysis of FISA.
In the end, the FISCR concluded that FISA searches are constitu-
tionally reasonable, and that they must meet the balancing test from
Keith.17 1 What the FISCR failed to acknowledge is that the few con-
straints imposed by the FISC on Justice Department operations concern
law enforcement operations that use FISA to avoid Title III. Only the
chaperone rule appears to have the potential to compromise effective
cooperation and information sharing. In this limited context, surely the
Justice Department and the FISC could develop a better arrangement.
E. A Failed Attempt to Obtain Supreme Court Review
In the latest twist in this remarkable tale, public interest groups led
by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) filed a petition for leave
to intervene and a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme
Court.'72 However, the ACLU acknowledged that FISA authorizes
Supreme Court review only upon petition by the government following
the denial of a government application by the FISCR. 73 Until now, of
course, there has been no petition filed for Supreme Court review
because the government has never before appealed to the FISCR, much
less to the Supreme Court. To obtain Supreme Court review under
FISA, the public interest groups had to overcome two difficult legal
170. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995).
171. FISCR Opinion, 310 F.3d at 746.
172. The names of the other interveners include the National Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers, American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, and Arab Community Center for
Economic and Social Services. See David L. Hudson Jr., Unusual Ruling Leads to Unusual
Filing: ACLU Asks U.S. Supreme Court to Review Intelligence Court's First Rescission, ABA J.
REP., Feb. 28, 2003.
173. 50 U.S.C. § 1803(b) (2000).
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problems: (1) they were not parties to the proceedings in the FISC or the
FISCR and had no right to such status; and (2) the government position
was supported, not denied, by the FISCR. The ACLU petition inter-
preted FISA's jurisdiction provision as reflecting only congressional
silence on Supreme Court review in these circumstances. In addition, it
interprets FISA as supporting an intention that the Court should correct
the FISCR when it makes a mistake.'74 Failing jurisdiction under FISA,
the interveners argued that the general authority to seek a writ of certio-
rari from a court of appeals 175 supports their claim, as does the All Writs
Act. "'76 Even if their statutory arguments succeeded, however, the inter-
veners also had to satisfy the Article III standing to sue requirements.
To meet this hurdle, the groups argued that they have associational
standing to represent their members because the members have suffered
actual or threatened injury from unlawful FISA surveillance.177
On the merits, the interveners argued that the FISCR should and
could have successfully avoided deciding the constitutionality of the
Patriot Act amendments to FISA by narrowly construing FISA to forbid
FISA orders when law enforcement is the primary purpose of the sur-
veillance or search. Otherwise, they urge the Court to "make clear that
the government may not constitutionally rely on any foreign intelligence
exception to the Fourth Amendment's usual requirements in investiga-
tions whose primary purpose is law enforcement rather than foreign
intelligence."' 78 According to these groups, decisions of such impor-
tance "should not be finally adjudicated by courts that sit in secret, do
not ordinarily publish their decisions, and allow only the government to
appear before them."' 79 On March 24, 2003, the Supreme Court dis-
missed the petition.'8 °
F. Useful Reforms
Congress should undertake a comprehensive review of FISA and its
role in counterterrorism and homeland security. Between its enactment
in 1978 and the amendment to permit physical searches using FISA in
1994, the statute remained unchanged. Since the mid-1990s, however,
174. See American Civil Liberties Union, et al. Petition for Leave to Intervene and Petition for
a Writ of Certiorari, In re Sealed Case of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review,
310 F.3d 717 (FISCR 2002) (No. 02-001) [hereinafter ACLU Petition].
175. 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (2000).
176. Id. § 1651(a).
177. See ACLU Petition, supra note 174.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Am. Civil Liberties Union v. United States, 123 S. Ct. 1615 (2003); see also Linda
Greenhouse, Opponents Lose Challenge to Government's Broader Use of Wiretaps to Fight
Terrorism, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2003, at A12.
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piecemeal changes to FISA have been added, often without careful con-
sideration of the effect of the new provisions on existing law. Some of
this has arisen from the rush to match developments in technology and
in terrorists' techniques for evading detection. The Patriot Act reforms
are only the most prominent examples.181 In light of the construction
given the Act both by the Department of Justice and the FISCR, Con-
gress should rethink the "significant purpose" change, and should
examine again the information sharing mechanisms it authorized. Sena-
tor Patrick Leahy opined that, if the government wishes to employ FISA
procedures for law enforcement purposes, maybe FISA should be
amended to incorporate Title III standards. 82 Alternatively, Congress
could simply return to the "purpose" language of 1978, or it could cod-
ify the FISC procedures to forbid that the prosecutors direct and control
a FISA investigation. Whatever the form of the correction, one is
needed. Congress should step up to the challenge of a comprehensive
reconsideration of FISA and its objectives. Because the portions of the
Patriot Act at issue in this dispute are set to expire on December 31,
2005,183 the opportunity for reform and reconsideration of Patriot Act
measures is particularly compelling.
In a February 2003 report, 184 Senate Judiciary Committee members
Leahy, Grassley, and Specter lamented what they characterized as a
series of FISA implementation failures by the FBI. They asserted that
FBI and Justice Department officials were setting "too high a standard
to establish that there is 'probable cause' that a person may be an 'agent
of a foreign power"' and, therefore, too high a standard for obtaining
surveillance pursuant to FISA. 185 The "probable cause" question is one
that merits serious legislative deliberation. There is nothing in the text
of FISA, very little in its legislative history, 186 and nothing in any of the
case law reviewing FISA surveillance that comments on whether the
different predicates (foreign agency and criminal conduct) in FISA and
Title III imply different "probable cause" standards in the two settings.
181. Amendments to FISA enacted in 1998 allow the government to install pen registers and
trap and trace devices (see 50 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1846), and to gain access to business records
(§§ 1861-1862). Changes made in 1999 expanded FISA's definition of "agent of a foreign
power" (§ 1801(b)(2)(D)).
182. Senator Patrick Leahy, Chairman, Comm. on Judiciary, The USA PATRIOT Act in
Practice: Shedding Light on the FISA Process, (Sept. 10, 2002) [hereinafter Leahy], available at
http://leahy.senate.gov/press/200209/091002.htm.
183. USA Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001). (Specific Provision?)
184. Interim Report, supra note 78.
185. Id. at 12.
186. See S. REP. No. 95-604 at 47 (1978) ("In determining whether probable cause exists under
this section, the court must consider the same requisite elements which govern such
determinations in the traditional criminal context.").
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This term of art may mean the same thing in both settings. If so, the
phrase has been defined by the Supreme Court in Illinois v. Gates187 as
requiring an examination of "the totality of the circumstances," includ-
ing the veracity and basis of knowledge of persons supplying hearsay
information "that there is a fair probability" that the criminal conduct is
occurring.' 88 The Gates Court concluded that "probability" based on the
"totality of the circumstances" was preferable to a "preponderance of the
evidence" standard.' 89 At a minimum, the part of the Gates standard
requiring "that the criminal conduct is occurring" should not apply
because no criminal occurrence is required to obtain a FISA order. Oth-
erwise FISA probable cause may involve the same factual inquiry as in
law enforcement investigations, subject to the possibility that Congress
may anticipate a lesser factual predicate when foreign intelligence infor-
mation is sought.
Among the more specific reforms to FISA that Congress could con-
sider would be a formal role for the FISC in reviewing and approving
FISA guidelines, akin to the role the Supreme Court assumes in review-
ing the Rules of Civil Procedure and Rules of Evidence. Moreover, the
appeal of the FISC decision lays bare the one-sided nature of FISA pro-
ceedings. Congress should consider an amendment to FISA that permits
the creation of a list of security-cleared counsel who could brief and
argue any subsequent appeals from the FISC. In the weeks after the
FISCR decision, a leaked draft of proposed legislation in the Justice
Department included such a proposal. 190
A proposed Patriot Act II has been widely circulated on the internet
recently. Although many of its provisions constitute the remains of what
was dropped from the 2001 Patriot Act, some of the proposals are new.
Of those that pertain to FISA, the most prominent include a carry-over
from the last Congress that would permit FISA procedures to be used in
investigations of "lone wolf' terrorists, eliminating the requirement of
foreign agency.' 9' Other provisions would expand the definitions of
"agent of a foreign power" to reach those for whom no criminal activi-
ties are shown, 92 expand the list of Department of Justice officials who
could authorize the use of FISA-obtained information by law enforce-
187. 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
188. Id. at 236, 238.
189. Id. at 238.
190. See Draft Version of Domestic Security Enhancement Act of 2003 ("Patriot Act II")
§ 108, available at http://www.dailyrotten.com/source.docs/patriot2draft.html.
191. See id. § 101.
192. See id. § 102.
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ment,193 lessen the requirements for obtaining FISA pen registers,'94 and
expand the wartime exception to the FISA warrant requirement. 9 5
VI. A FINAL ASSESSMENT: WHERE THINGS STAND Now
The government has proudly showcased what it views as some
important successes in the war against terrorism purportedly as a result
of the expanded authorities granted in the Patriot Act. For example, in
February 2003, federal prosecutors brought racketeering charges against
a Florida professor and seven others, based on allegations that they
financed suicide bombings in Israel.' 96 At a televised news conference,
the Attorney General stated that the indictment relied heavily on
expanded powers granted the Department after September 11. Depart-
ment officials told the New York Times that prosecutors "were stymied"
earlier by restrictions that previously limited the use of foreign intelli-
gence information in criminal cases. Prosecutors maintained that much
of the intelligence central to the indictment was only recently made
available to them, though much of the material is ten years old. Accord-
ing to the Department, changes in the law made by the Patriot Act in
October 2001 broke this logjam and permitted the prosecution to move
toward an indictment in this important case.
The FBI began investigating Sami Al-Arian, the principal defen-
dant, in the early 1990s and sought and received permission to conduct
electronic surveillance of his conversations pursuant to FISA. Under
FISA, officials had the capacity to bug Al-Arian's conversations without
ever informing him that he was under surveillance. They also had the
power to obtain permission for the surveillance without demonstrating
that Al-Arian was committing or about to commit a crime. 197 Over time,
the surveillance revealed evidence that Al-Arian and his co-defendants
were involved in raising money for suicide bombings and for the fami-
lies of suicide "martyrs" killed in their terrorist attacks.
The implication of the news conference and attendant media cover-
age was that before October 2001 the government was restricted legally
from doing what it needed in order to build a criminal case against these
alleged supporters of terrorism against Israel.' 98 Neither the implied
193. See id. § 105
194. See id. § 107.
195. See id. § 103.
196. Eric Lichtblau & Judith Miller, Indictment Ties U.S. Professor to Terror Group, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 21, 2003, at Al.
197. See 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(2)(C) (2003). Because AI-Arian is a United States person,
officials were required to associate him with national security crimes in order to obtain permission
for FISA surveillance.
198. Id.
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message, nor the Attorney General's statements hold water. To be sure,
the case against Al-Arian and his co-defendants is heavily laden with
foreign intelligence information, much of it derived from surveillance
conducted under FISA. However, before and after the Patriot Act, FISA
permitted foreign intelligence information to be used in criminal prose-
cutions so long as investigators sought the FISA surveillance for foreign
intelligence purposes. Nothing suggests that the Department ran afoul
of that limitation in FISA, nor that FISA or any other law limited the
sharing of information between the intelligence and law enforcement
officials working on the case. The delay was more likely attributable to
the massive number of documents involved in the surveillance opera-
tion, many not translated. In addition, there were possible differences
between the Justice Department and the U.S. Attorney's Office on how
to proceed in the case.
Furthermore, the dramatic public spectacle of a never-before-con-
vened secret court of appeals rebuking all of the judges of a twenty-five
year old secret court may be best understood as a product of the highly
charged security climate in which the dispute arose. The Patriot Act
became law within a few weeks of September 11, 2001. The Act was
the result of a remarkable campaign by the Attorney General and his
lieutenants to push through Congress a massive, complex, and contro-
versial set of reforms designed to enhance national security. Inevitably,
typical deliberation in Congress was shortchanged as members jumped
"on board" the war against terrorism. Staff work was rushed, interested
groups had little time to prepare or to participate in the debates, hearings
were curtailed, and committee reports were perfunctory at best. As
Solicitor General Olson remarked before the FISCR in commenting on
the meaning of the Patriot Act amendments to FISA, "we're not dealing
with perfect clarity here." '199 Although the government marshaled the
usual persuasive series of comments from key members of Congress
indicating that they understood that the change in FISA to "significant"
purpose would lower the barrier to the use of FISA procedures for law
enforcement, 200 the scant legislative history lacks any indication that
members or Congress as a whole considered the effect of the amend-
ments on FISA as a whole. In fact, the 1977-78 legislative history still
forms the major corpus of the rationale for and purposes of FISA, and it
continues to speak resoundingly about gathering foreign intelligence.
Moreover, the tinkering to FISA that was done in the Patriot Act failed
to change the specific requirement that an official employed in the area
199. Hearing Transcript, supra note 102, at 55.
200. See FISCR Opinion, 310 F. 3d at 732-33 (discussing Patriot Act legislative history).
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of national security make the certification that the FISA predicates have
been met.
Despite this truncated legislative process, the FISC and the FISCR
still had to interpret the law that was before them. The plain meaning of
the change in purpose favors permitting more involvement of the Crimi-
nal Division in FISA investigations. However, the purpose language
combined with the new information-sharing authority still does not sanc-
tion the Criminal Division's directing and controlling the FISA activi-
ties. If simple textual interpretation and the Patriot Act legislative
history leave any doubt on that issue, the underlying twenty-five year
old FISA understanding that the overriding objective of the special pro-
cedures is to permit the secret gathering of foreign intelligence informa-
tion supports the FISC-approved procedures. This notion is based on the
rule of statutory interpretation disfavoring repeals by implication.2"'
Looking back at the FISC and FISCR decisions, it is safe to say
that the rhetoric of crisis and fear seemed to outstrip calm reflection in
resolving this dispute. It was well known to all attendees at the FISCR
hearing that Solicitor General Olson suffered personally, as his wife was
a September 11 victim. While Olson's professionalism and skills as an
advocate are beyond reproach, his characterization of the FISC proce-
dures as making it "difficult for us to prevent another September ""202
while treating criminal prosecutors "as typhoid Marys ' ' 20 3 who "have
one or two hands tied behind [their] back" 2" did not contribute to rea-
soned debate. Like others in the Department, FISA novice Olson char-
acterized the purpose requirement as reflecting the need "to collect
information to protect the public and to protect the Republic."20 5 While
this principle is lofty and idealistic, FISA is much more specific in
defining its objectives. Likewise, Olson also conflated in his argument
the uses of FISA information and the purpose for which it is sought.2 °6
The FISCR opinion did not escape the aura of September 11. At
one point, the court noted the suggestion that pre-Patriot Act FISA rules
"whether correctly understood or not" may have led to missed opportu-
nities by the FBI to anticipate September 11.2°7 Although the court cau-
tioned that September 11 does not mean "that we should be prepared to
201. See William C. Banks & Peter Raven-Hansen, Pulling the Purse Strings of the
Commander in Chief, 80 VA. L. REv. 844, 855-56 (1994); see also Hearing Transcript, supra note
102, at 58.
202. Hearing Transcript, supra note 102, at 63.
203. Id. at 17-18.
204. Id. at 23.
205. Id. at 39.
206. Id. at 8-9.
207. FISCR Opinion, 310 F.3d at 744.
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jettison Fourth Amendment requirements in the interest of national
security,"2 8 its order that the FISC abandon its limits on the govern-
ment's FISA applications threatens to do just that.
At one level, the entire episode of the FISC decision and subse-
quent reversal by the FISCR made the proverbial mountain out of the
molehill and overstated the differences between the Department of Jus-
tice and the FISC. Once Congress acceded to the administration's pro-
posal to change the purpose language in FISA in the weeks after
September 11, there may be few actual instances when a "significant"
foreign intelligence purpose cannot be described to accompany a request
to the FISC under FISA that is otherwise seeking to build a national
security criminal case. The difference between forbidding a law
enforcement role in "directing and controlling" under the FISC 1995
Procedures and having the Criminal Division involved in the initiation,
operation, continuation, or expansion of future FISA activities may be
material in only a handful of cases.
As I have argued, the FISC was almost surely correct in its inter-
pretation of the overriding foreign intelligence gathering purpose of
FISA, though it was ill-served by its characterization of the intelligence/
law enforcement overlap as one merely involving minimization. Like-
wise, the FISCR was almost surely on firm ground in rebuking the FISC
for not responding to the Patriot Act arguments advanced by the govern-
ment, but it was amateurish in its characterization of FISA and its aims,
and heavy-handed in its disregard for twenty-five years of FISA history.
All of this came from an appeals court that had never before met and
that reversed an en banc FISC, where all seven members had considera-
ble experience in administering FISA. Finally, the FISC was on solid
ground in prescribing an OIPR monitoring role to manage the intelli-
gence/law enforcement overlap. However, the "chaperone" rule that
emerged may have been too cumbersome to be workable. Compromise
could surely have been reached had the FISCR not erred in unfamiliar
territory.
The appeal was a one-sided affair. No surveillance target hau had
his application for surveillance rejected below; although, if such a denial
had occurred, then the target would nonetheless not have been aware of
the denial or any appeal, and would not have been represented in any
FISA proceeding. Hence, the appeal was not adversarial in any
respect."0 9 The FISC was not represented on appeal, and only Depart-
ment of Justice personnel were permitted to join the FISCR in the hear-
208. Id.
209. Id. at 721 n.6 (The court noted that the ex parte nature of its proceedings allowed it to
entertain arguments for the government not presented to the FISC).
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ing room to witness the argument. Although the FISCR agreed to accept
and to consider amicus briefs after the hearing,21 ° the amici could not be
and were not well informed about the internal procedures for managing
FISA, and their briefs focused primarily on the Fourth Amendment
211issues.l
As construed by the FISCR, the Patriot Act change to permit FISA
surveillance or searches if there is a "significant" foreign intelligence
purpose is potentially unconstitutional. As the FISC noted, prosecutors
unburdened by the 1995 FISC minimization procedures may initiate or
take over an investigation using FISA procedures when they lack Title
III or Rule 41 probable cause, and without notice to the target or afford-
ing an adversarial discovery of the FISA applications and orders. 21 2 If
FISA procedures are followed in order to prosecute, the exception to the
warrant clause impliedly accepted by the Supreme Court in Keith does
not apply, and the Fourth Amendment requires a law enforcement war-
rant before the search or surveillance. Only a narrow reading of the
significant purpose requirement, within the larger foreign intelligence
framework of FISA, can save its constitutionality.
Apart from the issue of its constitutionality, the Patriot Act change
to "significant" purpose may have been ill-advised, as recognized by
several members of Congress during 2002 hearings.2 13 However, the
impetus for the change was to permit information sharing, not the direc-
tion and control of FISA surveillance and searches by the criminal divi-
sion. The FISCR resorted to dictionaries to support its conclusion that
"consult" includes giving advice. 2 4 But the critical activity is not
advice-giving, but rather direction and control. It is not persuasive to
assert, as the FISCR does, that authorizing consultation and coordination
(the aim of the Patriot Act changes) implies that either prosecutors or
intelligence officials "could be taking the lead" because no express limit
was included in the Act on direction or control.2 15 Sharing information
through consultation and coordination is not the same as running the
show. FISA requires that a national security official make the certifica-
tion in every case. Intelligence officials would normally take the lead;
the Criminal Division could do so only when a significant intelligence
purpose remains.
210. Hearing Transcript, supra note 102, at 67-68.
211. See ACLU Petition, supra note 174, at 24-36.
212. FISC Decision, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 624.
213. See, e.g., Leahy, supra note 181 (emphasizing that the Patriot Act "sought to amend FISA
to make it a better foreign intelligence tool. But it was not the intent of [the Act] to fundamentally
change FISA from a foreign intelligence tool into a criminal law enforcement tool.").
214. FISCR Opinion, 310 F.3d at 733-34.
215. Id. at 734.
1192 [Vol. 57:1147
AND THE WALL CAME TUMBLING DOWN
Throughout its analysis of FISA, the FISCR was disadvantaged by
any effective representation of the FISC and its views on appeal. The
characterization of the FISC decision as misapplying minimization pro-
cedures illustrates that the FISCR seized a possibly ill-framed portion of
the FISC opinion to make a broader charge. The court claimed that the
FISC was using minimization to control the dissemination of FISA
information even to FBI agents. A careful reading of the FISC opinion
reveals no such attempt. On the contrary, the FISC limited the Justice
Department only in those instances where prosecutors would attempt to
direct and control surveillance, where, in effect, the Justice Department
would employ FISA to run around the stricter requirements of Title III.
In addition, FISCR failed to grasp that any fencing in of FBI agents in
the Criminal Division was more likely the result of the institutional cul-
ture of the agency than of any rules imposed by the FISC. It may be,
however, that the practical effect of the FISC ruling as seen inside the
government was to prevent the intelligence agent from talking to the
criminal agent who was focused on the same subject or a related subject.
The impetus to tear down the wall is understandable. Cooperation and
coordination are markers for good government. However, aside from
the constitutional rights issues that stand in the way of prosecutors' tak-
ing charge of the secretive FISA process, there are reasons to suspect
that the wall actually has had positive net effects. The FBI National
Security and Criminal divisions traditionally have sought different kinds
of information, for different purposes. The natural rivalry between them
has arguably improved the end product. Field agents dig deep on a sin-
gle case or target and seek evidence of wrongdoing that may support a
prosecution. National Security personnel look at big picture develop-
ments and use the single case intelligence toward creation of the larger
tapestry. For the most part, the Criminal Division looks to past events,
while the National Security staff focuses on what may happen in the
future, connecting dots and trying to make programmatic sense of infor-
mation. It may make good sense to encourage greater cooperation and
coordination of intelligence and law enforcement functions in response
to the challenges posed by terrorism. These steps should be taken, how-
ever, without giving up the advantages of the specialization and rivalry
between them.
The finger pointing at intelligence failures before September 11 is
also lamentable for another reason. Hindsight visions are rarely clear
before the fact. As is its nature, the intelligence "dots" that were discov-
ered in the weeks and months before the attacks were ambiguous and
imprecise. It is tempting, but far too easy now to say in retrospect, that
the government could have known what was coming.
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Government works best when the branches work together, and
when different parts of the executive branch cooperate. The rare
glimpse at the secret surveillance mechanism afforded by the release of
the May 17 FISC opinion and subsequent appeal and decision in the
FISCR has shown that the changing U.S. environment for counterterror-
ism demands that all the principal government actors must cooperate in
reforming a system for such surveillance that keeps us safe and free.
Unfortunately, recent developments have exposed some dissonance
among those responsible for making FISA attain its aim of granting
extraordinary access to intelligence information in the hands of those
who would plot against the United States, while protecting the constitu-
tional rights of all persons.
